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1.  Paul Krugman 
U.S. Policy on Developing-Country Debt 
U.S. policy on Third World debt was a major anomaly in the first Reagan 
administration. On taking office, that administration was strongly committed 
to the ideal of laissez-faire economic policies, suspicious of international eco- 
nomic coordination, and opposed to new forms of  government intervention. 
Those administration officials who had strong views on the role of multilateral 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank-for  example, Treasury Undersecretary Beryl Sprinkel-were 
sharply critical, arguing that, by providing an implicit safety net for both bor- 
rowing nations and lenders, these institutions encouraged irresponsible behav- 
ior. Initial administration policy called for limiting the resources and the role 
of both institutions and for a greater reliance on self-policing in international 
capital markets. 
Yet, less than two years after taking office, the Reagan administration found 
itself at the center of an unprecedented piece of international financial coordi- 
nation. This effort involved discreet but unmistakable coercion of private cred- 
itors, a key role for the previously scorned multilateral agencies, growing com- 
mitment of public resources, and eventually a de facto alliance between the 
U.S. government and some debtors to pressure banks into relinquishing their 
contractual rights. It is instructive to imagine how an administration economic 
official in  1981 would have viewed the Mexican debt reduction package of 
1989, which in effect expropriated a large fraction of commercial bank claims, 
with partial compensation provided from official sources, that is, ultimately by 
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creditor nation taxpayers. (Most estimates suggest that the banks did not lose 
and may have gained as a result, but that is not the issue.) 
The question is how this policy emerged. How did a U.S. government that 
was ideologically committed to a hands-off financial policy, uninterested in 
international coordination, and convinced of the sanctity of property rights find 
itself leading a highly interventionist international effort that eventually came 
to center on debt forgiveness? 
This paper examines the evolution of US.  debt policy from the initial crisis 
through the 1989 Mexican plan, in an attempt to shed light on how and why 
policy decisions were made. It is important to emphasize that this paper is not 
primarily intended as an evaluation of  the appropriateness or success of  the 
policies  followed:  it  will  be  evident  that  I  have  my  own  views  about 
developing-country debt, but the main question here is why we did what we 
did, not what we should have done instead. 
The paper is in three main sections. The first provides a brief history of 
debt policy, highlighting several crucial turning points. The second discusses 
conceptual issues in debt policy, reviewing the options that faced the U.S. gov- 
ernment. The third is concerned with the actual process of  policy-making. A 
brief final section asks whether the evident defects in the process of  policy 
formation actually did much harm. 
11.1  A Brief History of Debt Policy 
Table 11.1 presents a selective chronology of the debt problem. Some of the 
events singled out are familiar tuming points; others are singled out because, 
in retrospect, they can be seen as indicators of future trends. The chronology 
also mixes real-world events with  statements and reports. Obviously, such 
events as the publication of Cline’s (1983) study on debt prospects were not as 
Table 11.1  A Debt Chronology 
1982  August 




1985  October 
1986  June 
1987  February 
May 
December 
1988  June 
1989  February 
March 
September 
Mexican weekend: onset of crisis 
Mexico reaches IMF agreement 
Rohatyn plan for debt reduction 
Cline study of debt prospects 
Alfonsin takes office in Argentina 
“Baker Plan” unveiled at Seoul 
Bradley Plan for debt reduction 
Brazilian debt moratorium 
Citibank reserves against LDC debt 
Mexico attempts to reduce debt via bond swap 
U.S. agrees to allow African debt reduction 
Riots in Venezuela 
Brady Plan 
Mexican debt reduction package 693  LDC Debt Policy 
important as, say, the Brazilian debt moratorium (practical men are the slaves 
of defunct economists, not live and kicking ones), but the statements are useful 
indicators of the drift in ideas. 
What the chronology alone cannot convey is a sense of the dynamics of the 








A “firefighting” stage from August 1982 through most of that fall, as des- 
perate efforts were made to mobilize enough financial resources to prevent 
a feared financial crisis: 
A relatively calm period in 1983 and 1984 during which problem debtors 
were widely viewed as being on the road to recovery, under programs that 
had as their centerpiece “concerted lending” by private creditors; 
As the concerted lending strategy came under widespread attack in 1985, a 
rethinking of that strategy that culminated in the Baker Plan-in  essence, 
a reaffirmation of the concerted lending strategy’s basic thrust, but with an 
increased role for official lending; 
The “menu approach” period, a period from 1986 through 1988 in which 
there was widespread optimism that new financial techniques could sub- 
stantially reduce debt burdens; and 
The official US.  acceptance of the idea of coordinated debt reduction in the 
so-called Brady Plan and a first effort at implementing that plan in Mexico. 
Let us review these different stages. 
1.1  Firefighting  L. 
Although it arguably should not have, the Mexican payments crisis of Au- 
gust 1982 took the U.S. government completely by  surprise. Federal Reserve 
staffers had prepared a report in April warning of potential debt-service diffi- 
culties, but this report did not receive high-level attention. The U.S. govern- 
ment should not be especially faulted for this, however, since few outside the 
government saw the crisis coming either. The rapid spread of the crisis to other 
debtor countries, most importantly Brazil, also came as a surprise. 
Ex ante, one might have expected some agonizing over appropriate govern- 
ment policy. Mexico and the other debtors who soon found themselves in dif- 
ficulty primarily owed their money to private creditors. Thus, one might have 
supposed that a free market-oriented administration would treat the matter as 
a private affair, especially given statements by such officials as Undersecretary 
Sprinkel in opposition to the international rescue role of the IME Indeed, such 
was the inertia of policy positions that, at the Toronto IMF-World  Bank meet- 
ings in September 1982, after the Mexican crisis broke, the United States was 
at odds with all other major nations in its opposition to any large increase in 
the IMF’s resources. 
In fact, however, with very little hesitation, the United States plunged into 
the provision of cash to Mexico. Substantial administrative creativity was dis- 694  Paul Krugrnan 
played in releasing cash; most notably, an advance purchase by  the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve was used to funnel funds to Mexico via its state-owned oil 
company. The Mexican example then served as a model for Brazil, Venezuela, 
and other countries as they developed similar debt-servicing problems. Any 
and all financial resources to hand-swap  lines, General Agreement to Bor- 
row, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) loans-were  pressed into ser- 
vice to avert an immediate default. 
In  retrospect, this emergency financing played the role of  a bridge to the 
more organized process of  rescheduling plus concerted lending. We  should 
not, however, abuse hindsight in interpreting the policy at the time. As of the 
early fall of  1982, emergency lending was not viewed as a temporary measure 
leading to a prolonged process of workout. Instead, the situation was viewed 
as both more dangerous and less fundamental-more  of  a bank run than a 
basic problem of excessive debt. The U.S. economy was in a deepening reces- 
sion at the time of the crisis, and there were widespread fears that Third World 
debt could trigger a  1931-style financial collapse. At the same time, it was 
generally expected that, if such a collapse were avoided, the crisis would blow 
over quickly: Treasury and Federal Reserve officials expected to see normal 
market access restored within months if not weeks. 
By late fall 1982, this perspective had changed in both respects. An immedi- 
ate financial crisis had been averted, and the growing signs of  a rapid U.S. 
recovery were making officials breathe easier. On the other hand, the magni- 
tude  of  the  debt-servicing problem became increasingly apparent, and the 
short-term emergency mentality shifted to a medium-term perspective. 
11.1.2  Concerted Lending 
The Mexican debt agreement of November 1982, and the similar agreement 
reached by Brazil in February 1983, set the basic pattern of debt policy for the 
next several years. 
The basic premise of this policy was that the problem of debtors was one of 
liquidity, not solvency. That is, while the debtors could not maintain normal 
debt service given their inability to attract new funds from international capital 
markets, they would eventually be able to grow out of their problems given a 
combination of  recovery in the world economy and appropriate policies at 
home, The main idea of the policy was therefore to buy time. If enough debt 
service could be postponed, countries might be able to meet their remaining 
obligations by  adopting austerity programs under IMF surveillance. As their 
export revenues grew, the countries would begin to look more creditworthy, 
and eventually they would resume normal access to credit markets.' 
1. Official statements during this period generally stressed the need for policy reform, not just 
austerity. That is, one would not simply wait for growth; one would do something actually to 
encourage it. In practice, however, this was little more than lip service. Optimistic estimates of 
growth prospects were based on historical relations between OECD growth and LDC exports, not 
on hopes for success of innovative growth-oriented policy, while the IMF-imposed economic plans 695  LDC Debt Policy 
Table 11.2  Long-Term Bank Credit Commitments to Developing Countries 
($billion) 
Developing Countries  Western Hemisphere 
Spontaneous  Concerted  Spontaneous  Concerted 
1983  17.6  13.9  1.9  13.3 
1984  12.7  16.5  .6  15.5 
1985  13.8  2.2  .2  2.2 
1986  14.7  8.1  .n  7.7 
1987  14.1  2.3  .4  2.3 
1988  11.8  5.7  1.2  5.2 
1989  12.9  2.3  1.6  1.6 
Source: IMF, International Capital Markets: Developments and Prospects (April 1990). table A22. 
The normal method of  postponing debt service is, of  course, rescheduling 
of repayment of principal. It was generally believed, however, that this would 
not  be sufficient-that  the debtor countries could not in fact run trade sur- 
pluses large enough to cover all the interest on their debt. Thus, there had to 
be de facto relending of interest payments. This could have been accomplished 
via interest capitalization, but this option was opposed for a variety of reasons, 
described in the appendixes at the end of  this paper. Instead, a more ad hoc 
approach was adopted in which existing creditors were rounded up to provide 
new loans the proceeds of which could be used to pay interest on existing debt. 
This procedure was widely referred to as “involuntary” lending but was more 
discreetly described as “concerted” lending in official documents. 
Table 11.2 shows the role of  concerted lending in the debt problem from 
1983 to 1989. It shows long-term credit commitments  by commercial banks to 
developing countries in general, and to Latin American countries in particular, 
and separates these commitments  into “spontaneous”  lending (i.e., normal vol- 
untary lending) and concerted loans. Two points stand out. First, for the Latin 
American nations, essentially all bank credit since 1982 has taken the form of 
concerted lending. Second, the major period of  such lending was  1983 and 
1984. It dwindled to negligible sum in  1985, and despite occasional pack- 
ages-for  example, the sizable package negotiated by  Mexico in 1986, after 
the combined effects of the 1985 earthquake and oil price collapse created a 
desperate need for cash-concerted  lending ceased to play a major role. 
It is also important for discussing the eventual abandonment of the concerted 
lending strategy to note that concerted lending was not identical either to net 
financing for developing countries or to the change in bank exposure. Bank 
exposure grew by less than the concerted lending numbers would suggest. To 
emphasized stabilization rather than growth. Realistically, US.  policy may be  summarized  as, 
“Get the debtors to run as big a trade surplus as they can, push the banks to relend the interest the 
countries can’t pay, and wait for better conditions.” 696  Paul Krugman 
a limited extent, this was because of a variety of leakages-for  example, repay- 
ment of principal on loans not covered by  rescheduling agreements and con- 
traction of short-term credit. After 1985, there was also a significant reduction 
in bank claims as a result of  debt buy backs, swaps, etc. Meanwhile, bank 
credit was supplemented by official credit and some other capital flows, such 
as direct investment, while offset in part by capital flight. 
Timing and coverage issues make an exact comparison difficult, but the 
rough comparisons shown in table 11.3 may be useful. From the end of  1982 
to the end of  1985, concerted lending commitments totaled about $30 billion. 
However, the commercial bank debt of fifteen heavily indebted countries rose 
by only $22 billion, and this rise was nearly offset by  a fall in other private 
debt. From the end of 1985 to the end of 1988, concerted lending commitments 
totaled approximately $15 billion; the change in bank claims was minus $1.5 
billion, largely because about $14 billion in claims was canceled through buy 
backs and swaps. 
Official financing nonetheless covered some debt service: the fifteen heavily 
indebted nations were able to finance a cumulative current account deficit of 
$17 billion in  1983-85  and of $35 billion in 1986-88.  (“Financing” through 
arrears played a significant role in the latter period.) 
In retrospect, it is apparent that the concerted lending strategy did not really 
function as advertised. It was initially envisioned that the brunt of the financing 
burden would in fact be borne by the commercial banks, with official finance 
playing a secondary role. In reality, this was true only at the very beginning- 
perhaps only in the first year. Thereafter, bank claims on problem debtors grew 
very slowly in nominal terms and thus declined both in real terms and a fortiori 
as a share of  bank assets, while official creditors bore a steadily increasing 
share of the risk. 
This risk shifting, which accelerated over time, would eventually be a key 
argument for the rethinking of debt strategy that culminated in the Brady Plan. 
In 1983-84,  however, this was far in the future. 
11.1.3  The Baker Plan 
There was a kind of pause in the debt problem during 1984. Essentially, this 
pause was due to a temporary glut of  cash in debtors’ hands. Debtor trade 
Table 11.3  Financing of Fifteen Debtors ($billion) 
1983-85  1986-88 
Current account  -17.0  -35.3 
Change in commercial bank debt  22.2  -1.5 
Change in other debt to private creditors  -18.4  -1.8 
Change in debt to official creditors  37.8  50.4 
Long-term borrowing from official creditors  34.7  32.1 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1990), tables A39, A42, A47. 697  LDC Debt Policy 
adjustment proceeded much more rapidly than had been expected: the fifteen 
heavily indebted nations moved from a trade surplus of  $4 billion in 1982 to 
$43 billion in 1984 and reduced their current account deficit from $5 1 billion 
to near zero. At the same time, the commitments from early rounds of  con- 
certed lending were disbursed. The result was that major debtors found them- 
selves with  swelling foreign exchange reserves and no immediate need for 
new financing. 
During 1985, however, pressures began to build again. The debtor countries 
had achieved their rapid trade improvement overwhelmingly through import 
compression rather than export growth, and a counterpart to the import com- 
pression was a severe slump in output. As debtor countries attempted to reflate, 
they found that the foreign exchange constraint was once again binding, and 
complaints rose about the increasingly niggardly supply of bank finance. 
At the same time, the prospects for a restoration of normal capital flows to 
problem debtors-an  event that had initially been expected to occur within a 
few years-appeared  to recede. In spite of a rapid economic recovery in the 
United States and a more modest one in the rest of the world, exports of devel- 
oping countries did not show strong growth. Indeed, thanks to falling commod- 
ity prices, they actually fell in 1985. Thus, the ratio of debt to exports, widely 
watched as an indicator of creditworthiness, worsened instead of improving. 
As a result, during the first half of  1985, there was a growing sense that a 
departure was needed in the debt strategy. A number of plans for debt reduction 
as opposed to further financing were circulated outside the U.S. government, 
and Preston Martin, the vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve, publicly called 
for  debt reduction  in  June  1985. He  was,  however,  reprimanded by  Paul 
Volcker. 
Instead, the U.S. government chose to emphasize a revitalization of the basic 
debt strategy of the previous two and a half years rather than a fundamental 
departure. In October 1985, at the Seoul IMF-World  Bank meeting, Treasury 
Secretary Baker  announced a program intended to expand financing  for a 
group of heavily indebted countries-the  “Baker 15,” now a standard subcate- 
gory in IMF analyses. 
Although hailed at the time as a major new  initiative, the Baker Plan was 
quite conservative in that it did not change the basic premises of the previous 
strategy. Debt problems continued to be viewed as issues of  liquidity rather 
than solvency, even though by 1985 it was no longer possible to attribute them 
to recession in the OECD nations. The United States remained firmly opposed 
to any debt package that involved debt reduction as opposed to a postponement 
of obligations. Indeed, until 1988, the United States refused even to allow other 
official creditors to offer unilateral debt forgiveness (which several European 
nations wanted to offer to desperate African nations), for fear that a damaging 
precedent would be set. 
The main innovation of the Baker Plan was its call for a shift in the sources 
of official lending, with the World Bank now expected to play a much larger 698  Paul Krugman 
role, shifting away from its traditional project lending. Under the initial pro- 
posal, World Bank lending would still have played a secondary role to con- 
certed lending by  private creditors: the initial plan  called for $9 billion of 
World Bank money and $20 billion from commercial banks over the next three 
years. In practice, as we have already seen, the Baker Plan had the effect of 
accelerating the shift of risk from the commercial banks to official creditors. 
It is also important to see the Baker Plan in context. It came closely on the 
heels of the Plaza Accord to drive down the dollar. Both actions were seen as 
indicating a new U.S. willingness to engage in international policy coordina- 
tion; in both cases it was widely expected that the initial actions would be only 
a forerunner to more extensive commitments. Thus, even though the sum of 
money proposed in the Baker Plan was modest even in prospect, the plan did 
temporarily dispel the sense that the debt strategy had run aground. 
1  1.1.4  The Menu Approach 
The renewed enthusiasm for a strategy of growing out of debt that followed 
the Baker Plan did not last very long. Among debtors, Peru and then Brazil 
tried a tactic of  aggressive confrontation with their creditors. In the United 
States, however, policy discussion was dominated for much of  1986 and 1987 
by hopes that market forces could be harnessed to alleviate the debt problem. 
Mexico instituted the first debt-equity swap program in  1984, and Brazil 
and Chile followed in 1985; by 1986, Chile’s program had assumed significant 
proportions relative to its debt, and it grew even larger in  1987. In essence, 
these programs allowed creditors to cash in their claims, provided that the pro- 
ceeds were invested in the debtor country and that other restrictions were met. 
The main attraction of such swaps was the existence of a secondary market in 
debt at which claims on problem debtors traded at substantial discounts from 
par. A potential investor could therefore make the investment at lower cost 
by  first acquiring debt on the secondary market, then convert that debt into 
local currency. 
Initially, debt-equity swaps were viewed with enthusiasm both by  U.S. fi- 
nanciers and by  U.S. officials. They were seen as a double advantage: both 
canceling a part of the debt, and thus reducing the burden, and attracting direct 
investment as a new source of funds. Over time, it became clear that the advan- 
tages of such swaps had been overstated; the limitations of debt-equity conver- 
sions are reviewed in the appendixes at the end of this paper. For a time, how- 
ever,  debt-equity  swaps  were  seen  as  demonstrating  the  possibility  of 
alleviating and perhaps even solving the debt problem through market mecha- 
nisms. The idea was that, by offering creditors a “menu” of  debt conversion 
alternatives, they could be induced both to cancel a significant fraction of debt 
and to supply a stream of additional financing. 
Chile proved unique in its willingness to pursue debt-equity conversions on 
a large scale relative to debt. In spite of pressure both from the financial com- 
munity and occasionally from the U.S. Treasury (which at times appeared to 699  LDC Debt Policy 
Fig. 11.1  Secondary market prices of LDC debt 
view a willingness to facilitate debt-equity swaps as a key  test of  debtor- 
country virtue),’ Mexico and other nations scaled back their programs because 
of  budgetary issues. There remained a hope, however, that sophisticated fi- 
nancial engineering could still play a major helpful role. The attraction of such 
schemes grew in particular because of a market event: the collapse of second- 
ary market prices. 
As  late  as the  beginning  of  1987, the  secondary market  discounts on 
developing-country debt were moderate: the average discount for the heavily 
indebted nations (fig. 11.1  ) was only about 35 percent, and that for Mexico and 
Brazil was less. In February 1987, however, an increasingly frustrated Brazil 
declared a moratorium on debt service, leading to a general decline in second- 
ary prices. In May  1987, Citibank announced that it was reserving against its 
developing-country claims, a move that was quickly matched by other credi- 
tors. In principle, reserving is an accounting  measure that should have had little 
real effect, but in this case it apparently served as a signal that the debt problem 
was not improving, and secondary market prices crashed further, to an average 
of 40 percent or less of  par. 
Given the huge discounts on developing-country debt, it was  natural to 
search for ways to capture that discount and pass at least part of it on to the 
debtor. A major effort along these lines was the Morgan-Mexico swap an- 
nounced in December 1987. New bonds were issued and offered in exchange 
for existing debt. The new bonds were expected to sell at much lower discounts 
than commercial bank debt, partly because their principal was guaranteed by 
money  placed in  escrow at the U.S. Treasury, but also because Mexico at- 
tempted to convince its creditors that the new bonds would be treated as senior 
to the old debt. Thus, it was hoped that the debt swap would reduce overall 
debt. 
2. The persistent faith of the U.S. Treasury in debt-equity swaps was demonstrated by  press 
interviews given by  Treasury Undersecretary David Mulford in the spring of  1989-by  which 
time the severe difficulties of such swaps were generally understood-in  which he argued that 
swaps could make a major contribution to the Brady Plan. 700  Paul Krugman 
In practice, the discount on the new bonds was much higher than hoped; to 
a first approximation, Mexico did no better than it would have had it used the 
money placed in escrow to finance a straight buy back of debt for cash (see 
Lamdany 1988). While hopes were expressed that a second try would yield 
better  results,  in  effect  the  disappointment with  the  Morgan-Mexico deal 
marked the end of optimism that a menu of clever financial packages could do 
much to resolve the debt problem (except, perhaps, at the U.S. Treasury, where 
the initial version of  the Brady Plan seemed to presume that small official 
resources could be leveraged up into major debt relief). 
1  1.1.5  The Brady Plan 
By 1988, it was already clear that the Baker Plan, like the previous concerted 
lending strategy, was not working as advertised. With debt claims selling at 35 
percent of  par and debt-export ratios higher than they had been in  1982, it 
was no longer realistic to suppose that a return to normal market access was a 
reasonable target for the medium term. Any  reconsideration of  the strategy 
was, however, unwelcome for most of the year, for two reasons: the administra- 
tion in general did not want publicly to abandon a widely touted policy before 
the election, and the secretary of the Treasury did not want to repudiate its own 
policy publicly. The United States was more willing than before to accept the 
idea of debt reduction in some circumstances. Notably, no objection was raised 
to the use of external resources to buy back and cancel much of Bolivia’s debt, 
and, in September, the United States agreed that other official creditors could 
forgive African debt if they so desired (although the United States would not 
participate). However, any major change in U.S. policy was ruled out. 
Following the election, however, an interagency group began serious discus- 
sion of debt strategy. According to accounts of participants, what this group 
found most alarming was not so much the generally disappointing results of 
the Baker Plan as the evident shifting of risk from private creditors to govern- 
ment and multilateral agencies. A chart that looked something like figure 11.2 
I  I 
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was the subject of alarmed discussion. This figure shows claims on the “Baker 
15” by private and public creditors, deflated by the U.S. CPI. Recall that both 
the initial concerted lending strategy and the Baker Plan were advertised as 
“bail-ins’’  rather than bailouts for banks; by late 1988, they were looking rather 
like bailouts after all. 
Adding pressure for a change were serious riots in Venezuela following im- 
position of an austerity plan in February 1989. Although it was quickly noted 
that Venezuela was perhaps the least deserving of  the debtor nations-more 
than  100 percent of  its debt accumulation had been used to finance capital 
flight rather than investment-the  riots reinforced a sense that something new 
had to be done. 
Finally, in March  1989, the new  Treasury secretary, Nicholas Brady, an- 
nounced that the United States now favored a policy of  debt reduction. The 
circumstances surrounding the Brady speech need further discussion and are 
revealing about the U.S. policy process; I return to these in the third section of 
the paper. For now, however, let us focus on the substance. 
As initially presented, Brady’s initiative had two somewhat contradictory 
features. On one side, for the first time Brady threw the support of  the U.S. 
government behind the idea of seeking debt reduction rather than growing out 
of  the debt problem. On the other hand, his speech emphasized the use of 
voluntary, market-based mechanisms to reduce debt. (Bankers were later to 
make a point of  the fact that the word Voluntary was used seven times in the 
speech). 
The reason these features were somewhat contradictory was that it was dif- 
ficult to envision any large-scale debt reduction within a voluntary framework. 
As initially presented, the Brady Plan seemed to envision the use of resources 
from creditor nations and multilateral institutions as sweeteners for financial 
engineering along the lines of  the Morgan-Mexico plan. The results of  that 
plan suggested, however, that such schemes would do little better than straight 
buy backs at reducing debt. A large debt reduction through buy backs, how- 
ever, would be extremely expensive, even at the secondary market prices pre- 
vailing at the time of the announcement-and  a buy back scheme would drive 
these prices up further. (Secondary prices of developing-country debt actually 
did rise by about a third in the two weeks following the Brady speech.) 
Following Brady’s speech, Treasury officials floated suggestions that a debt 
reduction on the order of 20 percent would be sought. Even though this seemed 
modest, the available resources at the World Bank plus other likely sources 
seemed inadequate to support voluntary debt reduction on that scale while at 
the same time continuing to meet debtors’ financing gaps. And, if  resources 
had been made available on the requisite scale, the benefits would have gone 
in large part to the creditors. 
This raises some interesting questions about U.S. policy-making. Why did 
Brady make a proposal that was immediately seen by knowledgeable observers 
as infeasible? Was it simply an error, or was it a way of establishing a position 702  Paul Krugman 
for a subsequent, achievable policy? I will return to these questions below. The 
important point now, however, is to note the position that the Brady speech 
created.  Essentially,  the  U.S.  government had  committed  its  prestige  to 
achievement of significant debt reduction, but such debt reduction could not 
be achieved without either committing much larger resources or abandoning 
the principle that debt reduction would be voluntary. 
Three alternatives thus presented themselves. The U.S. could forgo the goal 
of large-scale debt reduction, abandon the principle of voluntarism, or commit 
much larger amounts of  money than Brady seemed to have envisioned. It is 
still too early to tell the full story, but in general the United States gave ground 
on all three fronts. 
The reduction in the ambitions of the Brady Plan may best be seen by con- 
sidering the case of Mexico, which was the first major beneficiary of the plan 
and arguably the country for whose benefit the plan was devised. In the end, 
after very intense negotiations, Mexico achieved a reduction in the present 
value of its debt of approximately $14 billion, or 14 percent. This was clearly 
insufficient to make much real difference in the Mexican situation, although it 
was enough to count as a political victory for the Salinas government that indi- 
rectly raised confidence. Mexico was unique in its situation, both as a model 
of reformist policy and as a vital interest of the United States that would re- 
ceive special treatment in any case; thus, the modest size of the Mexican pack- 
age implies that the Brady Plan as a whole will be even more modest. 
Whether the principle of voluntarism has been abandoned is more controver- 
sial. As of  the time of  this writing, four debt reduction packages had been 
concluded subsequent to the Brady Plan-in  Mexico, the Philippines, Costa 
Rica, and Venezuela. The Philippine plan was of minor size both relative to its 
debt burden and in dollar terms, while Costa Rica is of course a small nation. 
Thus, the two major debt reductions have been the Mexican and the Venezue- 
lan, which essentially followed the Mexican model. 
In the Mexican debt reduction, the idea of voluntary action was essentially 
abandoned.  Mexican  debt  was  converted  into  new  instruments, and  the 
agreement contained a paragraph stating that the conversion would explicitly 
constitute a new contract (a “novation”). This was taken to imply that the new 
contracts would not be subject to the sharing clauses originally contained in 
loan agreements and thus in effect that banks that refused to participate in the 
debt reduction would not be able to demand payment. So the only “voluntary” 
aspect of the debt reduction was the choice among several options offered to 
creditors: whether to receive bonds with reduced interest payments or lower 
face value or, alternatively,  to offer new money. 
As compensation for the forced debt reduction, banks were given guarantees 
of principal and partial guarantees on interest. Evaluating these guarantees is 
tricky, but most estimates suggest that the compensation  per dollar of reduction 
in the present value of claims was well below the secondary market price of 
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reduction enhanced the value of remaining claims so that the market value of 
the debt after the reduction was little changed. 
In the appendixes at the end of this paper, I argue that a Mexican-style debt 
reduction package, in which banks are given the choice of exiting at the initial 
secondary price or of providing new money, is in effect a way of ensuring that 
the bulk of the benefits of the commitment money from international financial 
institutions go to the country rather than to its creditors. 
The Venezuela debt reduction was similar in form to the Mexican plan, in 
that a menu of options was offered; however, the terms were more generous. 
The size of resources available for debt reduction is to some extent an arbi- 
trary number. Initial estimates in the weeks following the Brady speech sug- 
gested that as little as $10 billion might be available. The current usual number 
suggested is $34 billion: $12 billion each from the World Bank and the IMF 
and another $10 billion from Japan. 
So the outcome of the Brady Plan to date is two fairly modest debt reduc- 
tions for large debtors-altogether  the debt reduction attributable to “Brady 
Plan” initiatives has been perhaps 5 percent of  the outstanding debt burden 
rather  than  20  percent.  The  form  of  the  major debt reductions,  however, 
marked a fundamental change in procedure: essentially, bank claims were 
seized by a kind of international eminent domain rather than through a volun- 
tary market transaction. 
1  1.1.6  Observations 
This brief history conveys two impressions. First, after the dramatic rescue 
operations of  1982 and 1983, the pace of events in debt policy seems remark- 
ably slow. The failure of the concerted lending strategy to deliver significant 
increases in commercial bank exposure was apparent by mid-1984, yet there 
was no revision of the policy until October 1985, and the Baker Plan amounted 
to a reaffirmation rather than a change in course. Even more strikingly, the 
failure of the Baker Plan to yield either significant new private capital flows or 
any prospect of a return to creditworthiness was evident by mid-1987, with the 
Citibank provisioning and the collapse of  secondary market prices. Yet  the 
Brady Plan did not come until March 1989-and  has moved forward at a very 
sluggish pace. 
Second, after the 1982-83  response, U.S. policy has consistently been very 
cautious about departures from previous strategy-to  an extent that seems to 
have surprised debtors and creditors alike. Thus, in 1985,  there was widespread 
expectation of a major rethinking of debt policy; the Baker Plan was instead 
more of  a continuation of  existing policy, with only modest new resources 
proposed and much less actually delivered. In 1989, the Brady Plan was ini- 
tially treated as a major departure in strategy, but it soon became clear that the 
United States was prepared neither to devote major new resources nor to back 
any radical demands for debt reduction on the part of  the developing coun- 
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The overall picture, then, is one of a U.S. policy on developing-country debt 
that has responded as little as possible, as late as possible-essentially  a reac- 
tive policy. (This is not necessarily a bad thing.) Later in this paper I will try 
to account for this absence of initiative. First, however, it is necessary to review 
the options on debt policy: what the United States might have done. 
11.2  Debt Policy Options 
The theory of  debt policy has been the subject of  an excessive literature. 
This paper will not review that literature in any depth; many of the key con- 
cepts appear in the volumes edited by  Sachs (1989) and by Frenkel, Dooley, 
and Wickham (1990). Instead, I want to focus on three key dimensions of 
choice in debt policy. 
The first dimension of choice is that of how much to have a debt policy at 
all-of  intervention versus laissez-faire. It was by no means necessary that the 
U.S. government intervene in the debt problem. Most of the debt of  problem 
debtors was owed to private creditors, primarily commercial banks. These pri- 
vate creditors lent money voluntarily before 1983, charging premia over low- 
risk rates that reflected their own judgment of the risk entailed in such lending. 
Why should the US. government take any responsibility if these risky loans 
happened to go bad? 
This is not as naive a question as it sounds. Before World War 11, as Eichen- 
green and Portes (1989) have noted, the U.S. government paid little attention 
to defending the interests of its bondholders with claims on Third World debt- 
ors. Even in 1982-83,  conservative critics of the emerging debt policy argued 
that, by intervening, the United States was reinforcing a moral hazard problem, 
in which banks would lend andor countries borrow irresponsibly in the expec- 
tation of a bailout. Later, a different critique would arise from the left, claiming 
that the U.S. government’s intervention had been detrimental to the interests of 
the debtors, deterring them from making a straightforward default. 
On the other side, there are several rationales for intervention. The most 
widely discussed have been the following: 
1. Stability of the internationalfinancial  system. Relative to the size of the 
world economy, the debt problem is not especially large. The combined gross 
national products of the “Baker 15” amount to only about 4 percent of that of 
the OECD, the face value of  their debt to only about  1 percent of  OECD 
wealth, the interest on that debt to only about one-quarter of  1 percent of 
OECD GNP. The Third World debt problem nonetheless provoked consider- 
able anxiety in 1982 because the debt was concentrated in the hands of large 
commercial banks, which are highly leveraged, so, even though the debt was 
small relative to the size of the OECD economy, it considerably exceeded the 
capital of  money center banks. As a result, it was feared that the debt crisis 
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of urgency about government intervention that overrode what might otherwise 
have been caution in 1982-83. 
2. Free-riderproblems. A few months after the onset of the crisis, one began 
to hear from a number of quarters the argument that government action was 
necessary to induce creditors to act in their own interest; Cline’s influential 
1983 study was representative on this point. The argument ran as follows. Once 
a country was in trouble, it was in the interest of any individual creditor to halt 
lending and, indeed, to pull out as much money as possible. When all creditors 
tried to do this, however, they provoked a liquidity crisis that would without 
action have forced immediate default. Yet there was a perceived possibility that 
the debtor countries could return to solvency given a breathing space and that 
creditors as a group would be better off if they gave the country time. So there 
was a conflict between the interests of  individual creditors and their collec- 
tive interest. As a result, official arm-twisting to force creditors not just to 
reschedule but to increase their exposure was actually doing them a favor. 
This argument also surfaced in a different form in later discussions of debt 
reduction, where it was argued that pure debt forgiveness might be in the col- 
lective but not the individual interest of the creditors. We  return to this point 
below. 
In either case, it is tricky to turn the free-rider argument into a case for 
commitment of  official funds to the process, which as we have seen was the 
bulk of the financing after the first year or so. However, a few shaky grounds 
for official finance can be offered. To  the extent that the United States and 
other governments might find themselves short of sticks with which to coerce 
banks into acting in their own interests, a carrot might have been necessary. 
Also, if coordination of creditors turns out to be difficult, official lending may 
be a second-best answer for protecting the value of claims that ultimately rep- 
resent domestic wealth. Early analyses of the debt strategy emphasized con- 
certed lending as the main solution to the free-rider problem, with official lend- 
ing as a secondary lubricant. As we  have seen, of  course, this is not what 
happened. 
3.  Other economic interests. Aside from the financial stake in recapturing as 
much as possible of the value of bank claims, creditor country governments 
found themselves with some other economic interests, notably on the trade 
side. Since the trade adjustment forced by the debt crisis primarily took the 
form of import compression, the debt problem had a significant impact on in- 
dustrial country exports. Arguably, then, this created a trade policy and/or mac- 
roeconomic interest in helping in a debt workout. 
While the trade consequences of  the debt problem were widely cited by 
reports prepared outside the government calling for more generous terms for 
the debtors, however, it is doubtful whether concern over these consequences 
played much role in actual policy. Notably, periods when debtor countries were 
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diately need much cash, were times of quiescence rather than urgency in U.S. 
debt policy. 
4. Political interests. The last concern motivating the U.S. government in its 
departure from laissez-faire on debt was concern over the possible radicalizing 
effects of  a confrontation between debtors and creditors. In particula,  the 
United States could not ignore the possible effects of debt on Mexican politics. 
It was not unimportant that the crisis first broke in Mexico; it is doubtful that 
the U.S. response would have been as swift and decisive had, say, Brazil been 
the first major debtor to get into trouble. It is also no accident that the first 
major Brady Plan debt reduction also involved Mexico; as described below, 
Mexican President Salinas deliberately  positioned himself so that a debt reduc- 
tion package was essential to him politically and thus in such a way  that the 
U.S. government had a compelling interest in making such a package happen. 
I would argue that, in practice, US. policy has primarily been motivated by 
the first and last of these concerns: by the desire to protect financial stability 
and by worries over the political implications of debt. The economic case for 
coordination arguably should have been driving U.S. debt policy, and lip ser- 
vice was given to it as a principle; but, in practice, when either financial or 
political jitters were absent, U.S. debt policy tended to drift. 
11.2.1  Financing versus Forgiving 
Given a determination on the part of the U.S. government to do something 
about debt, what should it do? Should it seek to postpone debt service, giving 
the countries involved time to improve their situation, or should it seek to re- 
duce the obligations of the countries permanently? 
The conventional view is that it is appropriate to “finance” the debt, simply 
postponing debt service, if the country’s problem is merely one of liquidity but 
that one should seek debt forgiveness if the country is insolvent. This is a use- 
ful way to ask what features of the country’s situation should be examined, but 
it is ultimately inadequate as a way of posing the problem. The reason is that 
a country that was demonstrably solvent would not be illiquid: it would be able 
to borrow from confident creditors. Thus, a debt problem is prima facie evi- 
dence of at least a significant risk that the country is indeed insolvent. 
Instead of a hard and fast distinction between liquidity and solvency, then, 
we  should instead ask whether creditors are best served by  maintaining the 
face value of their claims and playing for time or by reaching a settlement that 
reduces a country’s obligations. There is by now a standard way  of thinking 
about this issue, the “debt value curve” (illustrated in fig. 11  .3).3 
3. This curve, which I apparently first introduced (Krugman 1990),  is often referred to as the 
“debt Laffer curve.” I named it that  to emphasize the theoretical possibility that reducing debt 
could actually increase expected repayment. It is probably better, however, to drop Laffer’s name 
in order to  deemphasize the question of whether countries are literally on the wrong side of the 
curve-which  no major debtor can be confidently asserted to be. As it turns out, for Brady Plan 
issues it is more important to emphasize instead the fact that the curve may  be fairly flat in the 
relevant range-which  is borne out by the evidence. 707  LDC Debt Policy 
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Fig. 11.3  The debt value curve 
On the horizontal axis of figure 11.3, I show the face value of claims on a 
country, on the vertical axis the present value of  expected payments (which 
will normally be close to the value of the debt on the secondary market). For 
low levels of  debt, the face value will lie close to the forty-five-degree line 
since the country will almost always be able and willing to pay  in full. For 
higher levels of debt, however, the expected payments will fall short of the face 
value to a steadily increasing extent. And it is at least possible that, at suffi- 
ciently high levels of debt, less is more: that a reduction in debt would actually 
increase the expected payments to creditors. 
The reason for this potential downturn, if it happens, is that a debt burden 
so large that it is virtually unpayable acts like a heavy tax on an economy, both 
discouraging effective action on the part of the government and discouraging 
private investment. 
When is it in the financial interest of creditors as a group to forgive debt? In 
principle, when the country is actually on the downward-sloping side of this 
curve. In this case, a lower debt burden will improve a country’s prospects 
sufficiently to make the smaller face value of debt actually worth more. 
Four points should be noted about this analysis. First, the simple fact that 
debt is worth considerably less on the secondary market than its face value is 
not a sufficient indicator that debt reduction is in the interests of  creditors. 
There is a range of  the debt value curve that lies well below the forty-five- 
degree line yet is still upward sloping. Underlying this observation is the point 
that a debt that probably will not be paid in full nonetheless might be paid; 
creditors who reduce their claims lose the possibility of benefiting from sur- 
prising good fortune. 
Related to this point, it is by no means straightforward to evaluate  just when 
debt reduction is in fact in creditors’ interest. Estimates of the debt value curve, 
for example, by Claessens et al. (1990), suggest that some debtors may indeed 
be on the wrong side. But the largest debtors are not, and, in any case, these 
estimates are far from reliable and play no role thus far in practical discussion. 
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low secondary market price is more likely to be on the wrong side than one 
whose debt sells at close to par. The sharp fall in secondary market prices in 
1987 therefore made the case for debt reduction stronger but not conclusive. 
Finally, note that any case for debt reduction is, like the case for lending to a 
troubled debtor, a collective rather than an  individual one. Each creditor would 
benefit if all other creditors reduce their claims, but would prefer to maintain 
its own at full value. Thus, even when debt reduction is clearly in everyone’s 
interest, no individual creditor may be willing to act. 
On the whole, no convincing case has yet been made that debt forgiveness 
is in the financial interests of creditors-even  though such an assertion was 
less implausible by early 1989 than a few years previously. This may, however, 
be a misleading way to pose the question because U.S. policy interests are not 
purely financial. 
Suppose for a moment that, while private creditors are not convinced that 
debt reduction will actually raise the value of their claims, they do believe that 
the probability that the last dollar will be paid is low and that reducing the debt 
will at least somewhat increase the probability that what is left will be serviced. 
This amounts to a belief that the curve, if not downward sloping, is at any rate 
quite flat in the relevant range. In this case, creditors should be willing to agree 
to substantial debt reduction in return for modest compensation from official 
sources. And suppose that the US. government perceives other interests, say 
political, in promoting debt relief. Then a debt reduction deal will be attractive: 
a small expenditure of public money can buy large debt reduction, with non- 
economic benefits that outweigh the cost. 
Note that this is a different case for officially sponsored debt reduction from 
the usual one. Most calls for debt relief are based on the assertion that the 
creditor nations have a compelling, urgent national interest in debt relief. Here, 
their interest need not be so overwhelming because the costs of debt reduction 
need not be large. 
It is probably excessively charitable to think of  the Brady Plan as being 
based on a clear appreciation of  the likelihood that debt reduction could now 
be carried out cheaply, but in a vague way  the sense that banks could be in- 
duced to forgive debt with modest incentives did underlie the U.S. change of 
policy. Unfortunately, the plan immediately ran into a difficulty: the difference 
between collective and individual costs of going along. 
11.2.2  Voluntarism versus Collective Action 
Suppose that it is decided to pursue debt reduction, using official resources 
to compensate creditors. How should this debt reduction be carried out? 
One model would be to impose a concerted solution: each creditor must 
reduce its claims by some fraction (or exchange its claims for new claims with 
reduced debt service). Creditors might be offered some kind of compensation 
under such a model, but they would not be offered a choice. 
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untarily, by offering them the option of cashing in their existing claims for new 
claims that promise reduced contractual debt service but are “enhanced” in 
some way, for example, by guarantee of principal and some interest. 
The natural preference of a market-oriented administration is for the volun- 
tary approach-and,  indeed, in Brady’s initial speech the word voluntary was 
used repeatedly. Within a few days, it was apparent, however, that such a volun- 
tary approach would be prohibitively expensive, and the major debt reductions 
so far, in Mexico and Venezuela, have been essentially involuntary. 
The problem with the voluntary approach is straightforward. To a first ap- 
proximation, offering creditors “enhanced” securities is simply a sophisticated 
way of buying back debt. And the price at which debt can be bought back is 
likely to be much higher than the cost to creditors as a group of reducing debt 
by a single dollar. The reason is that the secondary price of debt represents the 
average value of  debt, that is, the fraction of debt that is likely to be repaid, 
not the marginal value, the likelihood that the last dollar will be repaid-surely 
a much lower number. 
Matters are even worse when a large buy back is announced because then 
the secondary price of debt will rise; the cost of the buy back will reflect the 
average value of debt after a debt reduction has increased the probability of re- 
payment. 
Figure 11.4 illustrates the point. It shows a debt value curve that does not 
turn down but that is fairly flat in the relevant range. D, is the face value of 
debt before debt reduction, D,  the face value after. V,  is the initial value of the 
debt on the secondary market and V,lD, the initial secondary price, indicated 
by  the broken line. 
The value of the debt to creditors will fall as a result of debt reduction, but 
only modestly, from V, to V,. Thus, one might hope that creditors could be 
induced to accept such a debt reduction in return for compensation of roughly 
V, -  V,.  But, if creditors are asked but not required to sell their debt, the cost 
will be much higher. The reason is that no creditor will sell claims for a price 
less than the secondary price that will prevail after the debt reduction, V,lD,. 
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The value of the initial stock of debt at this higher secondary price is V,.  The 
required outlay to reduce debt by D,  -  D, will thus actually be V, -  V,-a 
much larger sum than would be needed simply to compensate creditors for 
their losses. The difference represents an extra cost to taxpayers, for the benefit 
of the private creditors. 
While calculations based on estimated debt value curves should not be taken 
too seriously, they give some idea of  the problem. If the 20 percent debt reduc- 
tion number floated soon after the Brady speech were meant seriously, it would 
have required canceling some $90 billion in debt. Using the estimates of  the 
debt value curve in Claessens et al. (1990),  a buy back of this magnitude would 
have cost perhaps $40 billion in cash equivalent-considerably  more than the 
resources available even given the sizable warchest now  acc~mulated.~  Yet 
the sum needed to compensate creditors would have been much smaller, on the 
order of  $10 billion. The balance would represent a capital gain to creditors. 
For a larger debt reduction effort, the disparity would be even larger; Claessens 
et al. estimate that a $200 billion debt reduction would cost creditors about 
$25 billion but would cost $110 billion if achieved through buy backs. 
Given this arithmetic, why did the initial Brady proposal stress voluntary 
debt reduction? One possible answer is lack of clear thinking: as described in 
the third section of this paper, the circumstances of the Brady Plan’s formula- 
tion were sufficiently harried that sheer confusion probably played a role. An- 
other answer is that Treasury staff still hoped that clever financial packaging 
could have a multiplier effect on public resources-that  the lesson of the disap- 
pointing results of the Morgan-Mexico plan had not sunk in or been seen the 
same way at the U.S. Treasury as it had elsewhere. 
In any case, in the first major test of the Brady Plan, in Mexico, the idea of 
using a voluntary approach was quickly shelved. Instead, as already described, 
a combination of legal maneuvering and pressure on banks was used to leave 
banks no option other than to participate in a debt reduction program. 
By all accounts, however, the negotiations leading to the Mexico package 
were extremely difficult, leading to doubts about whether the U.S. government 
could achieve similar deals for other nations or would even be willing to try 
for countries of less strategic importance. (The Venezuelan deal may belie this 
expectation, but  the arithmetic of  that deal, is still unclear  at  the  time  of 
writing.) 
4. As noted above, official resources now available for debt reduction are typically estimated at 
around $34 billion. These resources are, however, available for loans and guarantees, not as cash. 
If the funds could be lent to finance cash buy backs without regard for the risk assumed by the 
World Bank and the IME they could still finance a considerable reduction in net debt: $34 billion 
if  the buy back price is 50 percent, $51 billion  if  it is 40 percent.  The international financial 
institutions have, however, been reluctant to engage in very large lending to finance buy backs, 
precisely because it would force them to assume too much risk-i.e.,  they prefer not to see the 
$34 billion lending authority as the equivalent of $17-$20 billion of simple cash outlays. 711  LDC Debt Policy 
11.3  The Process of Policy Formation 
Up to this point, I have described the policies followed by the U.S. govem- 
ment and provided a framework that tells us how such policies should be con- 
ducted. But what actually determined U.S. policy? 
To  state the obvious, policy-making did not at all resemble the textbook 
ideal in which the government is modeled as a single actor, well informed, who 
acts in the public interest. Policy was made through an interaction of a number 
of institutional players, not all of them inside the U.S. government proper; in- 
stitutional priorities and to some extent personal ambitions were key motiva- 
tions; and much policy-making took place in a fog of misconception and mis- 
information. In other words, debt policy was made in the real world. 
11.3.1  The Players and Their Motivations 
A key  organizing principle for thinking about U.S. policy-making is the 
“turf theory,” sometimes summarized as, “Where you stand depends on where 
you sit.” That is, the U.S. government may be seen as consisting of a number 
of institutions such as the Federal Reserve, the Treasury department, and so 
on, each of which has a built-in predilection for certain kinds of policy, based 
less on ideology than on what  serves the institution’s interests; policy then 
emerges from the interaction of these agencies. 
This way  of thinking about policy can be either excessively cynical or not 
cynical enough: an official at, say, the State Department might support policies 
that run  counter to the interests of  State per se either out of  conviction or, 
in the “revolving-door’’ system, because his longer-term career objectives lie 
elsewhere. Still, a turf-theory approach does seem to  yield a useful view of 
debt policy. 
Let us therefore review the main institutional players on debt policy. 
The Federal Reserve 
From 1982 until the resignation of Paul Volcker in 1987, there is little ques- 
tion that the Federal Reserve was the lead player in U.S. debt policy-in  spite 
of occasional efforts to dislodge it, as described below. This Federal Reserve 
dominance resulted from several factors. 
First, unlike counterparts at other institutions, Volcker himself took a sus- 
tained personal interest in the debt problem, regarding it as a central issue. 
(Indeed, one may even argue that his interest was excessive: what would have 
happened had he given equal attention to the savings and loan issue?) For ex- 
ample, at several points, Volcker personally intervened to put pressure on 
banks to go along with concerted lending packages. Volcker’s concern with 
debt, according to Federal Reserve staffers, reflected a sense of history and an 
urgent desire to avoid repeating the 1930s as much as a specific concern with 
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Second, the Federal Reserve had  a high degree of  continuity of  policy- 
making. Volcker, of course, served far longer than any of his counterpart Trea- 
sury secretaries. A similar or even greater disparity was visible at lower levels. 
Most visibly, Edwin Truman was  second-in-command on international eco- 
nomic issues for the whole decade; although he receives little press attention, 
Truman is a legendary figure among insiders for his acumen and knowledge. 
Third, by all accounts the Federal Reserve boasts a much more experienced 
and talented staff than any other agency can offer. At the crudest level, the 
Federal Reserve pay scale exceeds that of the executive branch. Perhaps more 
significant, the Federal Reserve is a highly professionalized and depoliticized 
organization, in which a civil service career can lead to very high-level posi- 
tions; this is in contrast to the U.S. government paper, where positions down 
to deputy assistant secretary or even lower are now usually filled by short-term 
political appointees. These appointees are less knowledgeable than their Fed 
counterparts, and it is difficult to attract ambitious staff at lower levels when 
they are aware of a fairly low ceiling on their ambitions. 
Fourth, traditional players in the policy game within the executive branch 
were unusually weak for much of the period 1982-89-even  the Treasury, and 
other players much more so. I return to this issue below. 
So for most of the 1980s the Federal Reserve played the most important role 
in setting U.S. debt policy. But what were its objectives? 
Clearly, the overriding objective of the Federal Reserve was financial stabil- 
ity. The emergency rescue operations of 1982 were led by the Fed, at times in 
the face of reluctance by  the Treasury, to prevent a potential banking crisis. 
The concerted lending strategy served the same function. The chief concern of 
the Federal Reserve was to head off country defaults that would force major 
banks into bankruptcy. In the initial period, this meant a preoccupation with 
maintaining the paper value of claims. 
Concern over financial stability galvanized the Federal Reserve into action 
in 1982-83.  But, as we saw, the pure financial stability issue faded in impor- 
tance as banks increased their capital. What motivated the Federal Reserve 
after that point? 
The answer is unclear. Some Federal Reserve staffers now concede privately 
that the policies of  1982-83-the  push for new finance, the opposition to any 
move that would write down debt and thus threaten the financial system- 
became reflexive and that the Federal Reserve developed a bias toward new 
money as opposed to forgiveness more on the basis of habit than of analysis. 
Indeed, arguably, the advantage of continuity in personnel had the disadvan- 
tage that officials from Volcker on down remembered what they thought in 
1982 all too well and were reluctant to propose policy changes that would 
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The Treasury 
Traditionally, the U.S. Treasury has been roughly coequal with the Federal 
Reserve in setting international economic policy. In the 1980s, however, the 
Treasury suffered from several disadvantages as a policy-making center. 
First, as already suggested, the Treasury was notably lacking in experienced 
players at high levels. During the first Reagan administration, the highest offi- 
cials at Treasury with any background or experience in international finance 
were at the deputy assistant secretary level. Nor were the high officials at Trea- 
sury widely regarded as quick learners: Federal Reserve officials were pri- 
vately scornful of their counterparts’ qualifications, and sources have reported 
at least one occasion in which the Fed’s Truman publicly reprimanded senior 
Treasury officials for their ignorance. 
This situation changed in some respects after 1985, when a new team includ- 
ing James Baker, Richard Darman, and David Mulford moved into the top 
positions at Treasury. Although none of these men had experience with interna- 
tional financial policy per se, they were much more highly regarded than their 
predecessors. However, the change in top personnel apparently did little to 
change the Treasury’s growing weakness at staff level. 
Part of this weakness was due to the general problems of the U.S. executive 
branch: low pay, lack of opportunities for promotion, and a gradual reduction 
in staffing. Press reports and conversations with sources confirm, however, that 
this structural problem was exacerbated by an attitude of disdain for staff work 
on the part of a series of  Treasury officials, from Regan to M~lford.~ 
As a result, the Treasury suffered (and continues to suffer) from a lack of 
effective staff work, which makes policy initiative difficult. One Federal Re- 
serve staffer asserts that “there’s nobody at Treasury who can build a spread- 
sheet.” 
Nonetheless, by virtue of its institutional position, Treasury has been a major 
player on debt. What are its objectives? We may  distinguish three levels of 
objective: administration, department, and personal. 
Since the Treasury is an arm of the executive branch, it is of course respon- 
sive to directives from above. On the domestic side of Treasury, there was a 
strong conservative ideological mission among many appointees in the first 
half of  the 1980s. On the international side, however, ideological crusading 
was relatively scarce. Especially after 1982-83,  the basic international finan- 
cial concern of the administration was apparent and clearly coincided with the 
Fed’s objectives: preserve the stability of the financial system. 
5. A  widely reported  anecdote bears repeating  here. When Mexican finance minister Pedro 
Aspe arrived at a meeting with some of his own staff, Mulford demanded that they leave, saying, 
“What are your [expletive] numbers guys doing here?” The US-trained Mexican team subse- 
quently took considerable pleasure in referring to themselves as “[expletive] numbers guys”. A 
confirming anecdote: soon after the signing of the Mexican debt reduction accord, Mulford rather 
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At the other end of the spectrum, individual officials at Treasury inevitably 
have their own agendas-agendas  that sometimes lead to conflict with the Fed- 
eral Reserve. Most important is the understandable desire of high officials to 
play an active role in formulating policy and to be seen doing so. This is normal 
but in the case of debt policy had some peculiar results. Treasury officials were 
generally inexpert themselves and poorly staffed; this made it difficult for them 
to play a leading role in policy formulation and generally put the Fed in the 
driver’s seat. Yet the Treasury officials chafed under this restraint and carried 
on a continual low-grade struggle to wrest control of issues away from the Fed. 
We may illustrate this conflict with two examples; the major example, the 
formulation of the Brady Plan, is dealt with below. 
First, throughout the post- 1982 period, administration debt policy was at 
least in principle formulated within some kind  of  structure of  interagency 
groups: a subset of the cabinet at the top, an assistant secretary-level  group 
below, and staff-level interagency task forces or working groups below that. 
At no point was the Federal Reserve represented in these groups. This makes 
some constitutional sense since the Federal Reserve is not exactly part of  the 
executive branch or, indeed, of the government. But, given the crucial role of 
the Fed in the actual policies, especially at staff level, the absence of even an 
observer status effectively gutted the process. The reason for Fed exclusion is 
generally acknowledged to be Treasury concern that the Fed would dominate 
the interagency process if it were allowed into the room. 
Another example of the pressures generated by the desire of Treasury offi- 
cials to play a more active policy role was the brief flurry of excitement gener- 
ated by Secretary Regan in December 1982, when at a G-5 finance ministers 
meeting he  suggested the need to create a new  international institution to 
handle the debt problem. This suggestion generated a flurry of  speculation 
about the apparent shift in U.S. policy and its reasons, but in fact the statement 
was undertaken on the secretary’s own initiative, without any prior staff work 
at Treasury, let alone interagency consultation. Staffers at Treasury speculated 
privately at the time that Regan’s statement had been motivated by the desire 
to play a more active role in the meeting. 
The efforts of the Treasury in effect to grab hold of the ball reached a pin- 
nacle in the case of the Brady Plan, but I return to that below. 
The Rest of the US.  Government 
One of the surprising aspects of U.S. debt policy has been the virtual silence 
of arms of the U.S. government outside the Fed and the Treasury. Within the 
executive branch, one might have expected some role for the State Department; 
outside, one might have expected some role for Congress. In fact, neither mate- 
rialized in any important way. 
Traditionally, the State Department plays the role of resident internationalist 
inside the U.S. government-the  advocate of measures that serve U.S. diplo- 
matic and political interests even at some financial andor economic cost. It 715  LDC Debt Policy 
might have been expected to advocate a soft-money policy, that is, more lend- 
ing in the early stages of the debt problem, an earlier turn to debt forgiveness. 
In fact, it did not. 
State’s silence was apparently due to the effects of politics on the choice of 
personnel.  George  Shultz,  as  secretary, had  surprisingly  little  interest  in 
economic affairs. His undersecretary for economics was Allen Wallis, an econ- 
omist with strong conservative credentials but little taste for policy formula- 
tion. And the assistant secretary for economics for most of the 1980s was Rich- 
ard McCormick, a former aide to Jesse Helms who, despite earlier experience 
as a foreign service officer, showed little interest in usual State Department 
preoccupations. 
Congress traditionally has little role in international financial (as opposed to 
trade) policy. The debt problem attracted the interest of a number of members, 
Senator Bill Bradley in particular. During the period between the Baker and 
the Brady plans, Bradley was perhaps the most visible advocate of debt reduc- 
tion. The so-called Bradley Plan, unveiled in 1986, remained a benchmark for 
such plans until the Brady speech, and Bradley received advice from leading 
academic advocates of debt relief, such as Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs and MIT’s 
Rudiger Dombusch. Treasury officials were routinely grilled on debt issues by 
congressional committees, and some sources suggest that the pressure from 
Congress on Secretary Brady and especially on Undersecretary Mulford may 
have played a role in provoking the Brady Plan. 
At no time, however, did Congress manage to find any direct lever for affect- 
ing debt policy. At no time in the 1980s did U.S. debt policy require enabling 
legislation.6  Only by directly passing legislation forcing a change in debt strat- 
egy could Congress have had any impact on the policy, and this was never a 
serious prospect. 
So the story of  U.S. debt policy is overwhelmingly one of  the Federal Re- 
serve and the Treasury. 
Outside Forces 
The U.S.  government played a leading role in determining debt strategy 
throughout the period 1982-89.  To some extent this is surprising since U.S. 
banks accounted for less than 30 percent of the bank loans to problem debtors. 
However, there was no other independent player able to formulate an alter- 
native. 
That said, the role of two other key players needs to be recognized. These 
were the following: 
1. The banks. The process of concerted lending led to the creation of bank 
advisory committees, effectively leading banks to speak with far more of  a 
6. Increases in IMF and World Bank resources did require legislation, and in principle Congress 
could have held them up as a way to exert pressure on debt policy. But, whether from lack of 
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single voice than usual. In some ways, these bank advisory committees were 
more of a match for the Federal Reserve than the Treasury, in that key mem- 
bers-especially  Citibank’s William Rhodes, who remained chairman of the 
Mexican advisory committee throughout the period-both  came to their posi- 
tions with considerable expertise and remained in place for extended periods. 
2. The ZMF:  During most of the 1980s, the IMF, like the Fed, was a highly 
professionalized institution under  a  strong leader. Arguably, the concerted 
lending strategy can be attributed at least as much to the IMF’s Jacques delaro- 
siere and his staff as to Paul Volcker and his. The staff work that helped lead 
to the 1989 change in policy direction also was largely carried out at the IMF 
rather than the Fed or the Treasury. 
The point for understanding U.S. debt policy in the 1980s is that the effec- 
tive policy-making apparatus was not contained within the boundaries of the 
U.S. government. Senior staffers at the IMF had more impact on U.S. debt 
policy than senior staff at any US. agency except, and perhaps including, the 
Treasury. 
11.3.2  The Rhythm of Policy 
Action Forcing Events 
Given this set of players, how was policy actually made? The best answer 
seems to be that policy was made as little as possible. The Federal Reserve’s 
interest in the debt problem was a narrow one: it wanted to preserve financial 
stability, which it came to interpret as meaning preserving the face value of 
bank claims. It would initiate policies when this goal was threatened, but not 
otherwise. 
The Treasury might have wanted to initiate policies aimed at broader inter- 
ests, but it lacked the knowledge and staff to formulate any departure in policy. 
Therefore, like the Federal Reserve, it acted reactively. The result was  that 
policy was very much driven by  “action-forcing events”; absent such events, 
nothing much happened. 
The first action-forcing event was,  of  course, the Mexican  crisis and its 
spread to other debtors. The Treasury and the Fed, together with the IMF and 
the bank advisory committee, moved cooperatively to head off the crisis and 
put together the concerted lending strategy: an altogether remarkable response, 
even though it did not in the end work out as planned. 
The Baker Plan does not at first sight appear to have responded to a similar 
event. However, the climate of dissatisfaction over the results of  debt policy 
was significant by  the fall of  1985; the United States (in general) and James 
Baker (in particular) were trying to establish a new regime of  international 
cooperation, and it was very necessary for political reasons that the United 
States present some kind of  plan at the Seoul meetings. If  this sounds like a 
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a weak policy initiative: cut through the favorable publicity, and one finds a 
modestly funded continuation of the existing strategy. 
The reactive character of  policy also appears in smaller responses. Con- 
certed lending, as we saw, evaporated after 1983-84.  No real effort was made 
to restart it, even after the announcement of the Baker Plan. When Mexico 
found itself in crisis in 1986 as a result of oil price collapse and earthquake, 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury once again set to work rounding up banks 
for another round of lending. 
The major change in policy in  1989, however, does not fit this description 
too well. What can we say about the genesis of the Brady Plan? 
The Brady Plan 
The genesis of the Brady Plan may be viewed in three quite different ways. 
All contain some truth. 
One way to approach the creation of the plan is to note the real reasons why 
such a policy change made sense. Playing for time, and waiting for countries 
to return to normal access, no longer made much sense. The stronger capital 
positions of banks made concern over the financial repercussions of debt re- 
duction less urgent. The decline in secondary market prices made debt reduc- 
tion appear more feasible with limited resources. The evident shifting of risk 
away from banks and to official creditors was raising fears that the process was 
turning into a bailout. Arguably something like the Brady Plan was long over- 
due, and the Treasury was simply doing what it should have done before. The 
Federal Reserve, one may argue, was simply too committed to its opposition 
to debt reduction to appreciate the obvious; the Treasury, once the author of 
the Baker Plan was gone and the election was over, was not. 
A second explanation, stressed by  several officials inside and outside the 
U.S. government, focuses on the special relationship between the United States 
and Mexico. The Salinas government in Mexico decided quite early on that it 
needed a debt reduction, as much or more for domestic political reasons as for 
strictly economic ones. And the Salinas administration, with its remarkably 
aggressive reform efforts, was the best Mexican government the United States 
could hope to have. Thus, there was a strong U.S. policy interest in giving 
Salinas some highly  visible reward.  In  a meeting between President-elect 
George Bush and Salinas in the fall of  1988, Mexico was essentially promised 
that something would be delivered; the Brady Plan may thus be seen as a way 
in which the United States provided a context in which it could do Mexico 
a favor. 
The final, cynical view is to think of the Brady Plan as in large part a turf 
struggle within the U.S. government rather than a serious response to real pol- 
icy concerns. 
The actual process by which the Brady Plan emerged was certainly a pecu- 
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change was carried out, as usual, by an interagency group in which the Federal 
Reserve was not included. Second, according to a number of sources, at a cer- 
tain point a special team was formed within Treasury, its activities kept secret 
even from the interagency group, to prepare a debt reduction plan. The number 
of staff was very small-three  or four people-none  of them with extensive 
background. 
Third, Secretary Brady announced his conversion to the idea of debt reduc- 
tion in a speech that was not cleared with other agencies (including the Fed) 
and was in effect presented to the White House as a fait accompli only shortly 
before delivery. Finally, when questions were raised about the conceptual basis 
of the plan (its reliance on voluntary debt reduction) and the size of  the re- 
sources required, the understaffed Treasury reportedly did not at first turn to 
the Federal Reserve for staff support: it turned to the World Bank and the IMF. 
This makes some sense since the international financial institutions would 
serve as the prime source of finance for debt reduction packages, but the ne- 
glect of internal staff resources is odd. 
In other words, while a good case can be made that the Treasury policy shift 
was a reasonable and indeed overdue response to changed circumstances and 
that it was also a deliberate foreign policy move aimed at Mexico, the actual 
process of  the policy shift looks suspiciously like an effort by  the Treasury, 
particularly by-now Undersecretary Mulford, to grasp control of the debt issue 
away from the Federal Reserve. In this it succeeded. 
11.4  Evaluating U.S. Debt Policy 
This paper is intended primarily as a descriptive rather than prescriptive 
exercise. Nonetheless, it is unavoidable that some evaluation be offered. 
U.S.  debt policy may be evaluated in two ways: as a process or by its results. 
It may seem that the latter always supersedes the former, that the proof of the 
pudding  is in  the eating. But  the uncertainties of  economics are too large 
to judge policymakers solely by  their success. Not only may  a good policy 
hit bad luck; officials may  be right for the wrong reasons or wrong for the 
right ones, Without question, one of  the ways  that Paul Volcker earned his 
right to be regarded as one of history’s great central bankers was by  his de- 
cisive actions on debt in  1982-83,  yet  a respectable case can be made that 
the world would have been better off had the Fed had a weaker leader and 
had  the debtors simply been allowed to go into open default, as they  did 
in the  1930s. So we  need to evaluate the process on its own terms, before 
asking whether the policies that emerged from it were actually more or less 
right. 
The policy-making story described in this paper is a mixed one. The initial 
phase of  U.S. debt policy was marked by  a rare combination of  intellectual 
clarity and decisiveness. After that point, the story is much less inspiring. As 
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1983-88,  intellectual confusion was rampant, especially over such issues as 
debt-equity swaps, and there was  a preoccupation with the public relations 
aspects of policy as opposed to substance. The pettiness and amateurishness 
of the policy process leading up the Brady Plan are fairly hair raising. On the 
other hand, policy formulation was untainted by  special interest politics (a 
brief flurry over James Baker’s holdings of Citibank stock was silly) and the 
international diplomacy by which agreement was reached quite skilful. 
What about the results? Was the policy actually a good one? 
There are two overwhelming facts about the results of the debt crisis in the 
1980s. First is that financial stability was maintained: there was no 1930s-style 
collapse. Second is that the economies of the debtor nations performed very 
badly: real GNP per capita in almost all highly indebted countries was lower 
in 1989 than it was in 1981. 
The policy response of  1982-83  can fairly take credit for the preservation 
of  stability. It is hard to see that any very different strategy could have been 
undertaken given what was known at the time; the actual strategy was imple- 
mented forcefully and bought time while the overall world economic and fi- 
nancial picture improved sharply. 
The question is whether another policy could have brought faster growth. 
The U.S. government could have been more aggressive in seeking to mobilize 
bank capital after 1983, and it could have sought a Brady-style debt reduction 
plan two years earlier. Alternatively, the United States could have declared a 
victory and gone home, implicitly encouraging debtor countries to go into ar- 
rears. In either case, the resource transfers from debtors to creditors might have 
been smaller. 
But would this have brought better economic performance? Many observers 
have contrasted the 1930s-during  which many debtors defaulted, then went 
on to do reasonably well economically-with  the almost universally dismal 
record of debtors in the 1980s. Eichengreen and Portes (1989) have also shown 
that, during the 1930s, countries that were willing to default early and mas- 
sively did better than those that were not. However, in the 1980s, there was no 
visible correlation between the burden of debt service and economic success. 
So by  selective use of  evidence, it is possible to make either case. One may 
maintain, as Cline (1990) implicitly does, that growth in debtor countries 
would have collapsed whatever the debt strategy and that the fact that the fi- 
nancial system has remained intact despite the growth collapse represents a 
signal success for policy. Or one may argue, as so many critics have, that the 
“overhang” of  debt that could not be eliminated because the preoccupation 
with financial stability acted as a major drag on growth. 
The political economy point, however, is that it is hard to see how the essen- 
tially reactive US.  policy could have evolved much differently. It is interesting 
as an economic counterfactual to ask what would have happened had, say, Felix 
Rohatyn’s  1983 global debt reduction plan been put into effect in 1984; but it 
was never a serious political possibility. 720  Paul Krugman 
Appendix A 
Debt-Equity Swaps 
Six years after Mexico introduced its debt-equity swap program, the eco- 
nomics of  such swaps are still the source of considerable mystification. Most 
economists working on developing-country debt regard swaps with consider- 
able suspicion, while many private-sector participants take their desirability as 
axiomatic. So it is worth taking some space to describe the issues. 
In essence, in a debt-equity swap, an investor is allowed to redeem external 
dollar debt for local currency, on the condition that this currency be invested 
in an approved local asset. From the point of view of the investor, this is a more 
attractive proposition than simply exchanging dollars for local currency at the 
central bank because the debt can be acquired at a discount on the secondary 
market. 
What does the country gain? It does not reduce its overall foreign liabilities, 
except to the extent that it charges investors a fee for the right to carry out the 
swap. Instead, it converts one kind of obligation, debt, to another, equity. The 
country also does not attract additional net foreign investment: when an inves- 
tor pays for his investment with the country’s own debt, as opposed to dollars, 
this does not provide any immediate increase in its ability to import. 
The potential gain comes instead from the change in the nature of the foreign 
claim. Equity investments will produce a stream of repayments to foreigners 
that is delayed relative to debt service, which may be an advantage in a country 
short of liquidity; they shift some risk from domestic residents to foreigners; 
and the foreign investors may bring intangible benefits in terms of knowledge, 
competition, etc. 
Against this potential gain may be set two potential costs. First, debt-equity 
swaps pose a fiscal problem. Essentially, they  “unreschedule” debt, forcing 
governments to redeem debt immediately. While the redemption takes place in 
local currency, simply issuing the currency would be inflationary, so respon- 
sible governments must issue new domestic debt to soak up the issue of local 
currency. The problem is that the real interest rate on this domestic debt is 
usually much higher than that on the rescheduled foreign debt that it replaces, 
thus aggravating fiscal problems. 
Second, in many cases, debt-equity swaps are used to finance investments 
that would have taken place in any case. They thus divert foreign exchange that 
would otherwise have  arrived at the central bank into the secondary market, 
aggravating rather than helping the liquidity situation. 
Most developing countries now appreciate these problems and have scaled 
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Appendix B 
The Limited Menu Approach in  Concerted 
Debt Reduction 
Both the Mexican and the Venezuelan debt reduction packages offered cred- 
itors a choice: either accept a conversion of debt into a smaller claim backed 
by  some enhancements, or provide new money. These schemes were intricate 
and are still the source of  considerable dispute. However, it may  be argued 
that, in principle, such a “limited menu” approach offers a neat way to reduce 
debt without providing capital gains to creditors. This argument is laid out 
formally by Diwan and Kletzer (1990); here, I summarize it briefly. 
It helps to imagine a scheme considerably simpler than either of the actual 
debt reduction packages. Suppose that creditors are offered only two choices: 
to be bought back at the market price prevailing before the scheme was  an- 
nounced or to provide new money in some ratio to original claims. Suppose 
also for a moment that creditors are identical in their concerns and expecta- 
tions. 
The new money option has an obvious undesirable feature: the new money 
is lent at an expected loss. However, the debt reduction that results from the 
buy backs should lead to a rise in the secondary market price of debt, and, by 
choosing the new money option, a bank preserves its ability to benefit from 
this rise. Now, notice that, if  a large number of banks choose the new money 
option, debt will not fall by much, and hence the secondary price will not rise 
much; this will make the new money option unattractive. Conversely, if  few 
banks choose new money, the secondary price will rise considerably, and new 
money will be more attractive. If the right number of banks choose new money, 
the new  money option will yield the same value as exit; and the fraction of 
banks choosing the new money option will tend to be such as to produce this 
result. 
In the Mexican case, those banks that chose to reduce their claims were 
given new assets that were, according to the estimates of Diwan and Kletzer, 
worth about 42 percent of original face value. Those banks that chose the new 
money option were obliged to increase exposure by 25 percent, but they bene- 
fited from a rise in the price of their claims to about 52 percent of par. Each 
dollar lent was lent at an expected loss of  1 -  .52 = .48, for a total loss of .25 
X  .48 = .12 per dollar of initial claims; but, by not accepting debt reduction, 
the new money banks realized a gain of .52 -  .42 = .10 per dollar of claims. 
Within the limits of reasonable uncertainty, the new money and debt reduction 
options were roughly equivalent. 
But notice that, in such a scheme, neither the new  money nor the exiting 
banks gain from the buy back. The exiting banks receive the ex ante market 
price; the new money banks are no better off. Thus, the whole of  any official 722  Thomas 0.  Enders 
resources provided go to benefit the country. In terms of figure 11.4, the debt 
reduction from D, to D, is achieved at the cost V, -  V,  rather than V, -  V,. 
To  the extent that banks differ in their preferences,  the limited menu  ap- 
proach has the further advantage of offering some limited accommodation of 
these preferences. 
The main problem with such a scheme is that it is difficult to predict how 
many banks will choose the  new money option and thus how much official 
money will be needed. If the new money requirement is set too high, few banks 
will choose it, and the resources needed for buy backs may exceed the available 
funds. This in effect happened in  the Mexican  case, creating some serious 
headaches. 
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2.  Thomas 0.  Enders 
To  put the debt crisis in focus, you can look at it from the point of view of the 
debtors, the commercial creditors, or the creditor governments. 
If you are most Latin Americans, the 1980s have been, as they often say, a 
“lost decade.”  The whole continent has stagnated, been marginalized.  Work 723  LDC Debt Policy 
available and income earned have fallen. You have been subject to some of the 
most extreme price rises in history. Violence and disorder in your neighbor- 
hood have grown explosively. You have watched the rich, already recipients of 
a disproportionate share of income, get richer. 
If  you are a commercial banker, it has been a mixed experience. You  made 
good money up front, but since then you have been coerced by the US.  govern- 
ment first to lend more, then to write down your claims. Many small debtors 
and one big one-Brazil-have  recently paid you little or nothing. Although 
some countries are recovering and accessing the voluntary capital markets, the 
crisis is by no means over. But you have had time to build up capital and loss 
provisions. The gross flows these last years and the remaining values are well 
short of pre-1982 hopes, but they are not insubstantial. 
If you are the U.S. government, you have given an uneven performance that 
is turning out well. As Paul Krugman reports, you failed to anticipate the crisis 
(with the exception of the chairman of the Federal Reserve and a few others). 
Then you misread it as due to the business cycle, not to a general crisis in the 
mercantilist growth model standard in Latin America and elsewhere. You got 
such things as financial engineering wrong and permitted one part of govern- 
ment to take initiatives to preempt others. But the things you feared didn’t hap- 
pen. The money-center banks didn’t  lose their capital. Latin America didn’t 
throw itself into the arms of dictators of the Left or the Right but made breath- 
taking steps toward democracy. Instead of confronting Washington, the hemi- 
sphere sought its help, first to twist arms for involuntary lending, then to 
permitktimulate a rise in official lending, then to force a write-down, and now 
to negotiate what may be the ultimate solution to the debt problem-North- 
South free trade. Moreover, you  found that you  could exercise a leadership 
role-the  initial rescue, the Baker Plan, the Brady Plan, the Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative-and  relatively easily beat back sporadic attempts by the 
French or the Japanese to outbid you. And most of the time you did it with 
other people’s money: from the commercial banks, from the multilateral agen- 
cies. Your policy was reactive, but that posture made you sought after in a way 
that you  hadn’t  been since the Alliance for Progress or the Good Neighbor 
Policy. Indeed, out of  the debt crisis there is emerging a remarkably close, 
confident, and fruitful North-South relationship. 
Looked at as a historian might, the results of this debt crisis appear to be the 
reverse of those of the first debt crisis in the 1930s. 
At that time, some countries defaulted early and massively. Few paid more 
than a few cents on the dollar (Argentina was the main exception). Much for- 
eign investment was nationalized. No government (other than the Mexican) 
survived the  decade.  In  many  cases,  military  regimes  replaced  outward- 
looking, if elitist, republics. Everywhere a new growth strategy emerged that 
centered on import substitution, was hostile to foreign investment, and exalted 
state enterprise. The new model often created monopoly opportunities for local 724  Thomas 0.  Enders 
capitalists. Unable to tax the monopolies, the governments sought to offset 
ever wider income disparities by such populist measures as subsidies for food 
and basic services as well as artificial exchange rates for key imports. 
Creditor governments intervened little to enforce bondholder claims, but the 
crisis set loose xenophobic and specifically anti-U.S. currents in a number of 
countries. 
Thus, while most of the world learned the lesson from the 1930s that au- 
tarchy did not pay, Latin America concluded that reliance on foreign markets 
and capital did not pay. 
Indeed, the new  growth strategy proved spectacularly successful, yielding 
continent-wide growth of some 6 percent for three decades to 1980. 
It was that record that again attracted massive flows of foreign capital to 
Latin America in the 1970s. And it was, of course, that record that desensitized 
bankers and governments to the risks. Had we been watching, we would have 
seen that foreign money was masking or aggravating the vulnerabilities of the 
Latin American growth model. Governments, never good at raising revenue, 
were relying more on borrowed money to cover expenses. Easy availability of 
resources was fostering ever greater misuse in essentially nonaccountable state 
enterprises. Local capitalists were exploiting artificial exchange rates to move 
huge amounts of capital out. 
What we do not know,  and must  leave to future historians to decide, is 
whether the import-substitution growth strategy could have survived if  Latin 
America had not borrowed so heavily in the 1970s, or if it had defaulted mas- 
sively in the 1980s, or if creditors had listened to those few advocating early, 
large-scale forgiveness. Maybe the collapse would have taken longer, but I per- 
sonally have no doubt that it was coming. 
What is certain is that, just as the injection of foreign cash exaggerated the 
import-substitution model’s weaknesses, the need to service the debt brought 
it under intolerable stress. 
Governments with weak revenue bases had to acquire from their citizens the 
resources to service the debt. Most ended up doing it by  printing money. There 
resulted a continent-wide inflation, in Argentina and Brazil at Weimar levels, 
in Mexico and Venezuela at lower but wholly unprecedented levels. 
Once again, it will be for historians to determine what finally convinced first 
Mexico, then Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, to attempt the radical liberaliz- 
ing reform of  their economies. I think that it was the searing experience of 
inflation out of control coming on top of the failure of their systems to respond 
to the worldwide upswing in the mid-1980s and the failure of official and pri- 
vate creditors, taken together, to come up with net new resources. Radical re- 
form then became the new politics of survival, notably for Mexico’s Revolu- 
tionary Institutional party. 
It would be comforting to think that the call for reform by the United States 
and other creditors, at first perfunctory, then with more feeling, had an impact. 
I doubt it. Rather-although  it was not their intention to impose runaway in- 725  LDC Debt Policy 
flation on Latin America-creditors  did contribute to it and thus finally to 
the start of  serious reform. And,  whatever you  think of  the financial engi- 
neering, when the new Salinas government, having already put through an ag- 
gressive liberalization program, turned to creditors for a dramatic gesture of 
support, the fact that the United States responded with the Brady Plan was of 
enormous importance in consolidating support for change within Mexico. 
There remain some important questions. 
The ultimate success of the reforms remains in doubt. Mexico, gratified by 
high petroleum prices, fears a US.  recession. Two-thirds of its exports are now 
nonhydrocarbons. And the democratization of the Mexican state must some- 
day be faced. Brazil’s structural reforms, which each week bite deeper into one 
of the few last remaining mercantalist economies, depend for their survival on 
success in containing inflation. They, too, could fall victim to a world down- 
swing. The debt crisis is unwinding, not over. 
Second, as the continent moves toward open markets, the willingness of 
Latin capitalists to recommit their resources to Latin development is still not 
confirmed. So far only a small part of  flight capital-which  may be as much 
as $150 billion-has  returned. Interestingly, people who trade in official Latin 
debt, as I do, have had little success in persuading Latin capitalists to invest 
in it. But money is going into private investment as a new  pattern emerges: 
government credit is more or less permanently impaired, while private enter- 
prise expands. To sustain growth, Latin America must attract much of the flight 
money back. 
Finally, what is done, or not done, in trade can be decisive. Latin America, 
and thus the debt problem, stands to gain much from a successful Uruguay 
Round. Free trade, first with Mexico, then with others, can be had only at the 
cost of a major political fight in the United States. But it can be the ultimate 
way out of the debt problem. 
What do I think of U.S. policy on Latin American debt in the 1980s? It was 
not foresighted or proactive, but it kept us engaged, moved us to respond at 
critical junctures, and contributed to, rather than thwarted, the historic transfor- 
mation now under way. 
3.  William R. Rhodes 
The adage that hindsight is 20120 is true only because of the corrective lenses 
that time provides. While historians will have the final verdict on what tran- 
spired during the debt crisis, this is offered as a blow-by-blow account of 
where the crisis started and where it is today from the viewpoint of a commer- 
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causes of the crisis, but I will offer some general observations on the policies 
that were followed by the various parties involved, including the creditor gov- 
ernments, the debtor governments, the international financial institutions, and 
the commercial banks. 
Before I get into the specifics, I would like to give you some background in 
both economic and political terms on Latin America-where  the debt crisis 
hit the hardest. In looking at the past and the present in Latin America, it is 
important to understand that, during the decade of the 1980s, there occurred 
the most significant change from military governments to democracies in the 
history of  the region. In other words, all during this very difficult economic 
period for Latin America, there was a move away from military government 
toward democracy. And, at the same time-particularly  toward the end of the 
decade-there  was a massive opening up of the economies to structural eco- 
nomic reform and privatization. Whether either or both of  these two trends 
prove definitive or not, they need to be kept in mind when thinking about the 
1980s and the future of Latin America. It is also interesting to note that what 
is going on now in Eastern and Central Europe has many similarities to the 
Latin American experience of the 1980s with the move toward democratic plu- 
ralism and economic reform. 
Beginning in August 1982, when Mexico decided to call its creditor banks 
together at the New York Fed, the so-called debt bomb became an international 
financial crisis without precedent in modem history. Along with the social and 
political impact felt by tens of millions in the developing world and particularly 
in Latin America, it resulted in a profound change in the business of interna- 
tional banking. It posed fundamental strategic business questions to thousands 
of banks worldwide, many of which had only recently ventured into interna- 
tional lending in the late 1960s and 1970s,  and certainly threatened the survival 
of many banking institutions, both large and small. In 1982 and 1983, many 
people were concerned about what the crisis would do to the international fi- 
nancial system itself. 
Other countries certainly had experienced debt-servicing problems before. 
There were the problems of  the 1920s and  1930s, and you  can go back to 
Argentina and the Baring Brothers crisis of the late nineteenth century. Cer- 
tainly, none of those earlier cases had debts the size of Mexico, Brazil, or Ar- 
gentina in the 1980s. Thus, those of us who were approached by  Mexico to 
work on the problem in August 1982 had no real road map to deal with any- 
thing of this size. However, given the stakes, we had to assume that the crisis 
could be managed. 
Looking back, we had two goals. First and foremost was to prevent the col- 
lapse of  the international financial system-obviously,  the banking system. 
Second, the countries needed help to eventually return to the private capital 
markets in order to finance what former Treasury Secretary James Baker liked 
to call “sustained growth.” 
If greed often drives people apart, fear often drives them together, and cer- 727  LDC Debt Policy 
tainly Mexico in August  1982 was an example of  the latter. There quickly 
developed an unusual international working arrangement among competing 
commercial banks, bank regulators, international financial institutions, creditor 
countries, and many of the borrowing countries. On the basis of experiences 
with earlier restructurings in the 1970s (e.g., Nicaragua, Jamaica, Zaire, and 
Turkey), the commercial banks organized themselves into steering-or  advi- 
sory-committees,  with membership based on the size of  exposure and geo- 
graphic representation. These committees were organized in coordination with 
each of the debtor countries, and it is important to remember that they were 
not put together by the banks alone but were requested by  the debtor coun- 
tries themselves. 
A major factor in this working arrangement at the beginning was the leader- 
ship of people like Paul Volcker at the Federal Reserve and Jacques de la Ro- 
siere at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A balanced and case-by-case 
approach was developed, recognizing the fact that each of  the restructuring 
countries had its own particular and peculiar realities. 
In  the first phase of  the crisis, commercial banks, of necessity, assembled 
short-term emergency financing packages. These involved restructurings to 
stretch out approximately two years of maturities over five to seven years and 
new money to meet the immediate cash needs of the borrower countries. The 
1982-83  restructurings of  Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil were set up along 
these lines. The countries, in turn, began to adjust their economic policies to 
reflect, belatedly, the changes that had been occurring over several years in the 
international economy. 
The  second  phase  looked beyond  the  countries’ immediate needs  with 
longer-term packages to buy time. The idea for this type of approach was first 
put on the table-again  by  Messrs. Volcker and de la Rosiere-in  the late 
spring of  1984 at the International Monetary Conference in Philadelphia, at- 
tended by the chairmen of the world’s largest commercial banks. I was asked 
to attend to represent the bank advisory committees. What emerged was an 
agreement that the IMF would institute enhanced surveillance or monitoring- 
something that has now long been forgotten. This meant that the IMF would 
monitor a country’s economic performance over periods substantially longer 
than normally done under standby or extended fund arrangements and that this 
information would be made available to the commercial banks. 
This  allowed  the  banks  to  negotiate  the  first  multiyear  restructuring 
agreement (MYRA) with Mexico later in 1984. This stretched out for up to 
fourteen years all debt maturing over a six-year period, as opposed to the maxi- 
mums mentioned earlier of seven years and two years. A more market-based 
approach started in  1984, when we negotiated a clause under which banks 
could convert debt into equity (the famous debt-equity swaps) as part of this 
same Mexican MYRA package. 
This marked the beginning of the concept of debt reduction. Although un- 
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negotiated with Argentina that allowed banks to  allocate part of  their new 
money commitment for trade or directly to clients in the country-something 
that we  call on lending. In  1985, the Chilean package further enhanced the 
menu of options idea, by providing for a variety of debt-reduction programs, 
mostly debt-equity swaps. The result of these programs of debt reduction for 
Chile has been a total reduction of over 50 percent of its long- and medium- 
term debt. 
Phase 3 was  aimed at  shifting the focus from  short-term adjustment to 
longer-term growth. It reflected the philosophy-first  expressed by Jesus Silva 
Herzog, the former secretary of finance for Mexico-that  the only way out of 
the crisis for the developing world was to grow out of it. This phase followed 
Secretary Baker’s decision that the U.S.  Treasury should be more actively in- 
volved in the management of the debt than it had been under his predecessor, 
Don Regan. 
In  October  1985, at the IMF-World  Bank meetings in Seoul, Secretary 
Baker announced his plan-the  so-called Baker Plan-for  world debt. Chief 
among the points was the emphasis on growth-oriented structural economic 
reforms by the borrower countries. In response to the countries’ economic ad- 
justments, the commercial banks were asked to continue to make available a 
prudent amount of new loans. What Baker suggested as prudent was $20 bil- 
lion over three years. One of  the major points of  the plan was to bring the 
World Bank into the fray because the debt strategy up to this point had been 
dominated principally by the IMF and Baker was calling for major involvement 
of the World Bank in structural adjustment. 
Although the Baker Plan is often attacked for not raising sufficient new 
money, Bill Cline of the Institute of  International Economics, who has spent 
the last seven or eight years studying the debt crisis, estimates that banks dis- 
bursed over $13 billion in net new loans to the Baker countries over the three- 
year period envisioned. Although the $20 billion mark was not reached, this is 
as much a reflection on the inability of  some of  the countries to make the 
structural adjustments that were a prerequisite as it is a reflection on the com- 
mercial banks’ unwillingness to lend in some cases. 
Meanwhile, the role of the market increased with the Argentine agreement 
of  1987, when the list of options was substantially expanded. This is when you 
first started hearing about the menu of options. To the bankers involved it was 
old hat, but to Washington and to the Treasury it was something new on the 
table. What we did here was to have cofinancings with the World Bank, trade 
financing facilities, new money bonds, etc. What is often overlooked in this 
agreement is that this was the first time that we put on the table an exit bond 
with a fixed below-market interest rate in order to try to stimulate debt reduc- 
tion. The Argentine exit bond, which was priced inadequately and lacked en- 
hancements, was a failure. Only three banks took it. However, it helped set the 
stage for the next phase, which was voluntary debt reduction. That was  in 
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lated similar action by many banks in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada. Obviously, the decision by Citibank was, to a great degree, stimu- 
lated by  Brazil’s declaration of  a moratorium on its medium- and long-term 
debt. Although that was not the only reason, certainly it was a major one that 
encouraged Citicorp’s chairman, John Reed, to go ahead with his reserving. 
This higher reserve gave banks greater flexibility to manage their loan portfo- 
lios through such debt-reduction options as exchanges of debt for equity and 
cash buybacks of debt. 
Following within a few months was the so-called Morgan-Mexico deal, 
which was another attempt at debt reduction. As you will remember, it was 
an offer to banks to exchange loans for bonds at a discount, with principal 
collateralized by U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds. This later became the basis 
for the so-called Brady Plan. The Morgan-Mexico deal did not produce the 
results that some had hoped for, most importantly because only the principal 
was collateralized, not the interest. Instead of reducing the debt by $3-$4  bil- 
lion, the deal reduced debt by  only $1 billion; but this certainly was a mile- 
stone. 
Although never fully implemented by  Brazil, the medium-term financing 
package signed in September 1988 to bring Brazil out of its moratorium dem- 
onstrated for the first time that new money and voluntary debt reduction were 
not mutually exclusive. Both the banks and the countries were now looking 
toward voluntary debt reduction as a major part of  these financial packages. 
The package itself contained $5.2 billion of  new money.  Unlike the earlier 
attempt in the Argentine deal, it was the first time that an exit bond was suc- 
cessfully put on the table with below-market interest rates (with 6 percent, 
twenty-five years, ten years’ grace). Some hundred banks subscribed to a total 
of  $1.1 billion of them. If the Brazilians had not initially restricted participa- 
tion, we probably could have obtained two or three times that amount. One 
interesting highlight is that, although Brazil later suspended interest payments 
on its medium-term debt to commercial banks, it never stopped paying interest 
on its bonds. 
This set the stage for the next event in March 1989, when Secretary Brady 
proposed voluntary debt reduction by  commercial banks. I would emphasize 
commercial banks because he said nothing in his statement about official debt 
reduction by  governments or the international financial institutions. This re- 
duction of debt by commercial banks became the focus of the debt strategy in 
place of new money. Secretary Brady did mention, however, some six or seven 
times in his speech before the Bretton Woods Committee the idea that some 
new money flows were still necessary, but most people did not pick that point 
up, and it certainly was not emphasized. The Group of Seven subsequently met 
on several occasions after the speech to work out guidelines, and the IMF and 
the World  Bank for the first time  agreed to offer resources to back debt- 
reduction programs for countries with viable economic programs. 
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February 1990. This package included most of the debt-reduction techniques 
used earlier, such as debt-equity conversions, interest rate reduction, and prin- 
cipal reduction bonds. It also incorporated many of the new money techniques, 
including bonds, trade finance, and on-lending facilities. In addition, the pack- 
age introduced two new techniques: collateralized interest for debt-reduction 
bonds and value recovery. These two innovations have since been incorporated 
into other packages, including the one for Venezuela. 
Where are we now? What follows are a few brief highlights. A number of 
countries have  implemented important economic reforms, including priva- 
tizations, and negotiated or completed agreements with their creditor banks. 
Mexico has put the debt crisis behind it and returned to the voluntary markets, 
and Chile and Venezuela should soon do likewise. Colombia and Uruguay are 
also close to regaining market access. However, two of  the largest borrower 
countries-Brazil  and Argentina-have  yet to reach agreements with creditor 
banks and have built up large arrearages. 
In reflecting on the events of the past ten years, there are some key points 
that should be mentioned. First, the strategy employed has proved successful, 
in that the debt problem no longer appears to be a systemic risk situation. 
Second, a key decision taken early in the crisis was the so-called case-by- 
case, or country-by-country, approach, a decision that continues today. It is a 
decision that is supported by  most of  the debtor countries. The alternatives 
were the so-called global solutions, of which we have seen many. The global 
solutions have two drawbacks: they do not speak to the differing needs of each 
individual country, which is why the countries have not favored them, and they 
tend to be forced rather than voluntary, which is why the banks have not backed 
them. Each country situation is different, and each requires a tailored solution. 
Also, there was a feeling that this type of solution would impede the countries 
from eventually getting back to the voluntary capital markets. The case-by- 
case approach has been followed from the beginning and is certainly a main- 
stay of the Brady Plan. 
Third, the advisory committee system, overall, has functioned well in repre- 
senting the interests not only of the creditor banks but also of the borrowing 
countries themselves. The committees have served as an informational pipeline 
for the borrower governments, who otherwise would find it difficult-if  not 
impossible-to  negotiate with the thousand or so interested banks at any one 
time around the world. These committees will be dissolved as the countries 
return to the voluntary markets. However, the potential usefulness of the com- 
mittees to a country was highlighted last year, when a number of commercial 
banks tried to get the Chilean government to dissolve its committee and the 
Chileans refused to do so. They wanted to use it one last time, in order to put 
a package on the table to assure Chile’s return to the voluntary markets. 
Fourth, although the commercial banks have been criticized for not being 
sufficiently supportive, I believe that they have  generally met the financing 
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and certainly they have done so for those countries that have instituted viable 
economic reform programs. For example, since the Brady Plan was announced 
in March 1989, the banks have completed or arrived at preliminary packages 
with substantial debt reduction and/or new money for Mexico, the Philippines, 
Costa Rica, Morocco, Venezuela, Chile, and Uruguay, along with a refinancing 
for Colombia with a new money tranche. I think that the process has been 
flexible and has evolved over the years. For example, we have had the introduc- 
tion of  a longer-term menu of  options through the voluntary debt-reduction 
mechanism, including debt-equity exchanges, cash buy backs, and interest and 
principal reduction bonds. I think that these innovations have bought time for 
the countries to institute the necessary structural economic reforms, including 
privatization. 
One of the major conceptual errors from the beginning of the debt crisis was 
the idea that the countries were in a short-term liquidity situation and that all 
that was needed was short-term stabilization programs of eighteen to twenty- 
four months. The results of this view were programs that lasted a maximum of 
two to two and a half years. The countries often ignored the need simultane- 
ously to make basic structural economic reforms, including privatizations, in 
order to lay the basis for investment and growth. 
Many people did not understand the important point that, if  the countries 
did not change basic structures and open up their economies and privatize, one 
stabilization program after another would end in failure. Certainly that was the 
case in Brazil, Argentina, and even with the initial programs in Mexico. As an 
example, Brazil had about seven letters of intent with the IMF over a four-year 
period. What you  ended up with was a vicious cycle because the necessary 
economic structural changes were not being made. 
Even in the case of Mexico, it was not until late 1985, under President de la 
Madrid, that the country finally decided to join GATT. At the same time, the 
government began putting in place the necessary mechanisms to reduce the 
role of the public sector through privatizations and the closing of a number of 
inefficient and money-losing state institutions, such as Fundidora Monterrey. I 
think that one of the hopeful things that we are seeing today is that most of the 
governments in Latin America are beginning to recognize that stabilization 
alone is not good enough, that you must have basic structural changes, includ- 
ing privatization. 
I hope that the importance of structural reforms will not be lost on the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe. While Poland quickly initiated a courageous stabiliza- 
tion program to combat inflation, only recently did it begin its structural adjust- 
ment program centered around privatizations. The delay in adopting structural 
adjustments has made it difficult to create markets for labor and capital and 
has cost the country needed investment. 
I am also concerned about the Brady Plan’s emphasis on voluntary debt re- 
duction alone, with little interest in new money flows from commercial banks. 
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tion, often encourage banks to end their lending relationships with the coun- 
tries. However, in order to grow, there will still be a need for some flows of new 
money from at least a core group of banks-that  is, if a country is pursuing its 
program of  structural reform and privatization and is becoming competitive 
and creditworthy. Despite the skepticism of  some that banks would not lend, 
even where there were proper conditions, examples of the willingness to lend 
new money are the recent agreement with Venezuela and, most important, the 
return of market access for Mexico. 
A growing impediment to bank lending, however, is the substantial amount 
of overdue interest owed by  some countries. These arrearages to commercial 
banks from restructuring countries worldwide amount to nearly $24 billion at 
the end of the third quarter of  1990, with Brazil and Argentina accounting for 
more than half. Arrearages undermine confidence in a country, not just among 
banks, but among other potential investors, local and foreign. Funds are not 
likely to flow to those countries that fail to regularize their financial obliga- 
tions. Bank arrearages have also encouraged arrearages to the IMF and the 
World Bank. But I would put to you  that part of  the problem was in these 
institutions themselves because  in  many  ways  they  encouraged  the  coun- 
tries to use arrearages as a form of external finance. Certainly, there are those 
people who believe that that was  implicit in the Brady initiative. I do not- 
think that the secretary meant that. But it is only recently that the U.S. Treas- 
ury  has  come around to recognizing the importance of  this  issue, and, if 
you  read the G-7 statement at the September 1990 IMF-World  Bank meet- 
ing, you will see that they finally understood that the arrearage problem is a 
serious one. 
The progression in the use of  debt reduction also concerns me. It was first 
used by the commercial banks, then appeared as the focus of the Brady Plan, 
and then was proposed for President Bush’s Americas Initiative. One of  the 
dangers in this progression is that new money flows could be diminished or, in 
some cases, even halted. An interesting question, therefore, is, To what extent 
should debt reduction be viewed in the context of new money? 
When we look back at this crisis, there is still one question that I believe 
needs further review. I am referring to the criticism directed toward the banks 
in the 1980s for overlending, by the regulators, and by officials of the interna- 
tional financial institutions, saying that banks did a poor job in the two recycl- 
ing efforts of the 1970s. One could ask, however, where was the G-5, and the 
official sector in general? They were not prepared to lead the effort, so the 
commercial banks took it on. What would have happened if the major industri- 
alized countries had decided to step in and head the recycling effort, using, 
among other things, the international financial institutions more actively than 
they did to achieve this goal? Under the circumstances, the banks did a reason- 
able job-perhaps  not good enough in some cases-but  nobody else stepped 
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Summary of Discussion 
Paul Krugman began the discussion by asking about the real effects of reserv- 
ing. Reserving appears to an economist to be simply a relabeling of some of a 
bank’s assets with no real consequences. In particular, a decision to increase 
reserves appears to have no impact on either the present or the future cash 
flow of the bank. Yet  financial markets view decisions to reserve as important 
events. Why? 
William Rhodes said that Citibank’s 1987 decision to increase its reserves 
had been based on a recognition on their part that they had not seen the prog- 
ress that they had hoped for since 1982. They had recognized that times had 
changed and wanted to be more flexible with their portfolio. This basic ratio- 
nale had been somewhat lost in the theatrics of the press coverage, but Rhodes 
emphasized that Citibank had certainly not chosen to increase its reserves by 
so much in order to put other banks in a more difficult position. 
Rhodes believed that Citibank’s decision had had a large effect on the fi- 
nancial markets because of the bank’s long-standing leadership role in interna- 
tional lending. Citibank was the largest international lender, so many people 
thought that Citibank’s increase in reserves indicated a widespread recognition 
that  American banks  were underreserved and undercapitalized in  the face 
of  the LDC debt problem. Another possible effect of  the reserving decision 
was that many developing countries wanted to reduce their own debt balances 
in line with the discounting of their debts on banks’ balance sheets. 
Martin Feldstein summarized Rhodes’s description of reserving as a combi- 
nation of a public admission of the seriousness of the LDC debt problem and 
a reaction by developing countries that they should pay the banks less money. 
But that combination should have lowered the value of  Citibank stock, not 
raised it, as actually happened. 
Rhodes said that Citibank had been quite surprised that the stock price had 
risen temporarily because they had expected it to fall themselves. In any case, 
however, the change in stock price had not been the focus of their attention. 
Thomas Enders asserted that Citibank’s reserving decision had involved a 
much more precise allocation of capital to the risks on its balance sheet. This 
effort to identify the bank’s problems had been viewed by the market as an 
important step toward better management of the bank’s assets, thus boosting 
the value of the stock. 
William Poole offered another explanation for the rise in Citibank’s stock 
price. At the time, the U.S. government had been coercing many banks into 
lending additional money to the developing countries, and banks with higher 
net worth were more likely to be coerced. When a bank transferred capital into 
its reserves, it became more difficult for the bank to be put into a position 
where it would have to put up-as  the market saw it-good  money after bad. 
Rhodes said that this had not been a consideration for Citicorp because they 
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countries. He admitted that this issue may have played a role in other banks’ 
subsequent reserving decisions. 
Robert Litan maintained, however, that Poole correctly explained how the 
market had perceived Citibanks action. 
Krugman then shifted the discussion to the Brady plan [named for Treasury 
Secretary Nicholas Brady]. Rhodes described the Brady plan as a voluntary 
debt-reduction plan, which is the way  that Brady’s original speech had de- 
scribed it. But the biggest Brady deal to date, involving Mexico, had not been 
a voluntary plan; although the creditors had had some choices, doing nothing 
had not been one of them. 
Rhodes said that, although the Treasury Department had pushed the banks 
to participate in the Mexico plan, most of them had been prepared to partici- 
pate anyway. One reason is that, unlike Brazil and Argentina, Mexico had never 
defaulted on its interest payments. A second reason is that Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas had been implementing a structural reform package that the 
banks had liked. So, although it had been possible for the banks to challenge 
the Treasury plan publicly, all but a few banks had believed that Mexico de- 
served support anyway. 
Feldstein said that, of the five major changes in U.S. debt policy that Krug- 
man had described in his paper, the introduction of the Brady Plan had been 
the most dramatic one. Feldstein wondered what had caused this change and 
whether the banks had been involved in the change before it was publicly an- 
nounced. 
Rhodes answered that an important motivation for the Brady plan had been 
the political situation in Mexico. President Salinas had emphasized to Presi- 
dent Bush the importance of debt relief, and Mexican Finance Minister Pedro 
Aspe  had  visited Brady several times to make the  same point.  So it was 
Rhodes’s understanding that the Brady Plan had not been just Brady’s idea but 
had had the full backing of the president because of the situation in Mexico. 
Rhodes continued that Treasury Undersecretary David Mulford and his staff 
had consulted with a few bankers before the public announcement, but not 
with very many. Rhodes said that he had spoken with Mulford before the an- 
nouncement and had stressed two issues. First, he had argued that the debt 
reduction should be voluntary, not mandatory. He had thought that a mandatory 
plan would be of doubtful legality and would not induce the cooperation of the 
international banking community in the way that a voluntary plan would. Sec- 
ond, Rhodes had argued strongly that there should be a continuing flow of new 
money to countries that were creditworthy and were implementing appropriate 
economic reforms. Unfortunately, this issue did not receive much attention at 
the time, which the Treasury now regrets because they realize its importance. 
Feldstein added that the Brady Plan had been developed at the Treasury 
Department with little input from either the rest of  the executive branch or 
from the Federal Reserve. Feldstein also hypothesized that the introduction of 
the Brady Plan may  have been due to a new Treasury secretary wanting to 735  LDC Debt Policy 
make his mark, not to any change in the fundamentals of the debt situation or 
in the thinking of other people at the Treasury Department. 
Michael Mussu suggested that the introduction  of the plan had been deferred 
until after the election, along with other bad news like the savings and loan 
disaster. Feldstein did not think that announcing the Brady Plan a year earlier 
would have cost any votes. 
Churls Walker said that Brady had been scheduled to make a speech to the 
Bretton Woods meeting and that people had known in advance that it was sup- 
posed to be a major policy announcement. Thus, Brady had told the president 
that they could not back down from the plan at the last minute. 
Rhodes believed that Mulford’s views on debt reduction had in fact changed 
by the time of the Brady Plan, but he also agreed with Feldstein that Brady had 
wanted to take a fresh look at the problem when he became Treasury secretary. 
Rhodes reiterated, however, that the primary motivation for the plan had been 
the political situation in Mexico. 
Enders added that, whatever the reason that the Treasury had decided to take 
some action on the LDC debt problem, the Brady plan was possibly the only 
approach that met the critical test of not requiring government money. 
Litan turned the discussion to the origins of  the LDC debt crisis. Rhodes 
said that, because the leading central banks and the international  organizations 
had been playing no role in recycling petrodollars, the large commercial banks 
had had no choice but to do that recycling by lending funds to the less devel- 
oped countries. This description made it sound as if the banks had made these 
loans out of a sense of civic obligation. It is also possible, Litan argued, that 
the U.S. government, and the Federal Reserve in particular, had coerced the 
banks into making these loans. Or maybe the banks had simply entered into 
LDC lending in search of higher profits. Litan asked to what extent the Fed 
had been encouraging the banks to recycle, taking a hands-off approach, or 
warning the banks to be careful about this kind of lending. 
Rhodes said that the banks had not been coerced or pushed into making 
LDC loans. Citibank Chairman Walter Wriston and other leading international 
bankers had felt that this lending was somewhat of a crusade to help both the 
international financial system and the developing world, and the speeches of 
senior bankers during the  1970s had been replete with comments about the 
banks performing a needed public function because nobody else was doing it. 
Rhodes said that the U.S. government and many  Western governments had 
praised the banks for their actions, but, in the end, it had been bankers’ deci- 
sions to make those loans; no one had forced them. 
William Taylor said that he did not know what the regulators’ views about 
LDC lending had been in the early and mid-1970s but that, by the late 1970s, 
the banks were being cautioned about their overexposure in the developing 
countries. 
Enders noted that the issue of recycling petrodollars had been a major pre- 
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had been great applause for the banks’ willingness to receive the deposits and 
invest them but that, despite this substantial encouragement, there had been 
no coercion. 
Geofsrey Carliner alluded to Enders’s previous assertion that the LDC debt 
crisis of  the  1980s had worked out better than the debt crisis of  the  1930s 
because of  the involvement of the U.S. government. Was it a widely shared 
view that the crisis would not have been resolved as well if  the government 
had taken a hands-off approach during the 1980s, as it had during the 1930s? 
Rhodes discussed two reasons why the debt problems of the 1980s had been 
resolved in a better way than the debt problems of the 1930s.  First, the Bretton 
Woods institutions had not existed in the 1930s. It had made a big difference 
in the 1980s to have an International Monetary Fund that could bring together 
debtors and creditors and provide useful information as well as money. Rhodes 
said that both Volcker and Jacques de la Rosiere had worried that, if the debt 
problem had not been managed promptly and with the help of  the Bretton 
Woods institutions, a financial crisis could have ensued. 
Second, the 1930s debt had been almost entirely in the form of bonds, while, 
by a “stroke of fortune,” the 1980s debt had been almost entirely in the form 
of bank loans. The resulting concentration of creditors had made it possible to 
renegotiate the terms of the debt in ways that would have been impossible with 
a diffuse and anonymous group of bondholders. 
Feldstein wondered whether the concentration of creditors really had been 
a stroke of good fortune. Because the loans were concentrated in the money 
center banks, a default on the debt could have triggered a true financial crisis. 
If  the debt had been securitized, however, with bonds dispersed around the 
world in many separate portfolios, a default on the bonds would not have trig- 
gered a financial crisis. Feldstein said that a decline in the value of LDC debt 
of $100 billion would have represented only 2 percent of the value of the New 
York Stock Exchange. While this would have meant a significant loss to some 
bondholders, it would not have imperiled the financial system as a whole. 
Rhodes responded that the ability of the debtor countries to buy time, which 
had been greatly facilitated by the debt being in the form of loans, had been 
important. Taylor added that the developing countries had been able to work 
out their loans, while they would have been forced to simply default on any 
bonds. 
Feldstein wondered if  the debtor countries would be able to reenter the fi- 
nancial markets more quickly because there had been workouts of the old debt 
rather than defaults on it. He added that the 1980s debt crisis might not have 
arisen at all if the debt had been in the form of bonds because the bonds would 
probably have paid fixed interest rates. Thus, the sharp increase in interest rates 
from 1979 to 1982 would have reduced the value of the outstanding bonds, but 
it would not have forced the developing countries to default on their payments. 
Jefsrey Frankel said that the 1980s debt problem had been worsened by the 
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were reflected one for one in changes in short-term interest rates. If the interest 
rates on the debt had been linked to commodity prices rather than to other 
short-term interest rates, the debt problem would have been much less severe. 
Krugman pointed out that economic growth in the Latin American debtor 
countries had been relatively strong in the 1930s in the face of  a disastrous 
world economy but had been very poor in the 1980s with a fairly strong world 
economy. So it seemed bizarre to argue that there had been a better outcome 
to the 1980s debt crisis. 
Rhodes responded that virtually none of the 1930s debtor counties had been 
able to return to the financial markets until after World War 11,  which showed 
the high cost of defaulting. He also believed that the decline in the value of 
LDC bonds in the early 1980s would have been much larger than the $100 
billion mentioned by  Feldstein. Finally, he thought that the actions of  the 
money center banks had been the only realistic way  to recycle petrodollars 
during the 1970s, especially considering that the G-5 countries in particular, 
and the official sector in general, were not prepared to lead the effort. 
Enders contrasted the continued involvement of developing countries with 
financial institutions during the 1980s with the default and subsequent with- 
drawal of developing countries from world financial markets during the 1930s. 
He asserted that this continued involvement in the 1980s,  made possible by the 
use of loans rather than bonds, had meant that pressures could build up within 
the developing countries that are now resulting in fundamental economic re- 
forms. 
William Niskunen said that most of the debt policies of the U.S. government 
had seemed designed to cost money to either American banks or American 
taxpayers. He asked whether it was clear that those policies had been on net 
beneficial. 
Enders said that both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department had 
made substantial use of so-called swap lines at various points in the LDC debt 
crisis and that, if there had been defaults on those loans, there would have been 
real losses for American taxpayers. But the use of the swap lines had been very 
important-for  example, they had played a critical role in the recent Mexican 
agreement-and  in fact there had been no losses for taxpayers. 
There had, of course, been great losses incurred by the banks, and the central 
question was whether those losses would have been larger or smaller without 
the involvement of  the government. Enders believed that the actions of  the 
government and of the international organizations had helped keep the banks 
engaged with the developing countries until the countries had been ready to 
undertake serious reform. In the end, this reform will give the banks an oppor- 
tunity to recoup more of their original investment than if the debt problem had 
been left solely to market forces. 
Enders added that  Volcker and others in the Federal Reserve had had  a 
stronger sense of  the importance of  the developing countries to the United 
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at that time, the history of the debt problem might have been quite different 
than it was. 
Rhodes added that  Volcker and de la Rosiere had been instrumental in 
“bringing order to a process that was being driven by  fear.”  He thought that 
those two people in particular had been important catalysts in creating a global 
framework for dealing with the debt problem. After that framework had been 
set, however, he believed that it had been right to allow the banks and countries 
to negotiate between themselves. 
Mussa argued that a key reason that the petrodollars had been recycled 
through the international banking system had been the perception of  several 
parties that the governments of the developed countries would intervene to 
protect their interests. The people with funds to deposit had assumed that the 
governments would in some way guarantee the value of those deposits, and the 
bankers had assumed that the governments would help the banks collect on 
their outstanding loans. Mussa believed that this de facto intervention by  the 
governments had represented a serious distortion of the international allocation 
of capital. 
As for government intervention after the crisis began, Mussa conceded that 
there was an argument for government intervention to prevent a financial crisis. 
But he wondered whether an early default and an immediate writedown of 
banks’ assets, as with creditors in a typical bankruptcy resolution, would have 
been preferable to the long, dragged-out process through which the same end 
had been achieved gradually. 
Feldstein noted that some people in Washington had been suggesting a more 
lenient treatment of  debtor countries well before the Brady plan had been 
adopted. Would it have been better if the Brady Plan had been adopted earlier, 
or was it right to wait until countries like Mexico had initiated significant eco- 
nomic reforms? 
Enders responded that, if the U.S.  government had produced more resources 
or induced more debt forgiveness at an earlier point in the crisis, it would have 
greatly eased the developing countries’ short-term problems but also greatly 
prolonged them. Enders explained that, when the debt crisis began, he had 
been very worried that Latin America was a political tinderbox, and he thought 
that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve should have taken a more lenient 
position for foreign policy reasons. But, when the international institutions 
proposed a variety of sensible policy actions and made their loans conditional 
on policy performance in the usual way, very little changed in the debtor na- 
tions. In the end, fundamental economic reform was instituted only when the 
people had become desperate. In Mexico, for example, it was the runaway 
inflation that had ultimately persuaded the country to start the reform process. 
So more debt relief at an earlier time would simply have prolonged those coun- 
tries’ underlying economic problems. 
Enders emphasized that he was not opposed to the small amount of aid that 
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favor of  making those resources available and of  encouraging coordinated 
lending by  the banks. He thought that it would actually have been damaging, 
however, to have made  large quantities of  aid available through an early 
Brady Plan. 
Rhodes responded to several previous comments. First, he addressed the 
merits of  an early Brady Plan, arguing that neither the banks nor the debtor 
nations would have benefited from it. In 1982, the banks did not have sufficient 
capital or reserves to cover the asset writedowns that were required for signifi- 
cant debt reduction. By  1989, they had increased their capital and reserves 
sufficiently to make the Brady plan possible. Also, Rhodes said that he shared 
Enders’s view that the debtor countries had not started to implement basic 
structural  reforms until 1985. Their previous reforms had consisted of a variety 
of short-term stabilization programs-based  on adjusting the exchange rate in 
an attempt to build trade surpluses-that  did not address their fundamental 
economic problems. When banks had tried to “prime the pump” for reform 
in Argentina by  lending money in advance, Rhodes felt that it had actually 
exacerbated their problems. 
Second, Rhodes said that, although he could not speak for any other banks, 
Citibank at least had not thought that the U.S. government was going to stand 
behind their loans to developing countries. If  mistakes had been made, they 
were the bank’s own mistakes and had not been made on the assumption that 
someone would  bail  them  out.  Rhodes  said  that  he  sometimes  believes 
that commercial bankers are driven by fear, greed, and ignorance, but he hoped 
that some lessons had been learned in the 1980s. In fact, he thought that the 
future problem would be, not profligate bankers lending money to everybody, 
but rather a dearth of banks that lend to the developing world. 
Enders concluded that the LDC debt story was ending reasonably well, al- 
though maybe for the wrong reasons. The U.S. government had not devoted a 
lot of  resources to the problem, but, because major political upheavals had 
been avoided, there is a good chance of  improved economic growth in Latin 
America. This Page Intentionally Left Blank